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Summary  
In this thesis, I will challenge one of the most fundamental assumptions of psychological 
science – the universality of facial expressions. I will do so by first reviewing the literature to 
reveal major flaws in the supporting arguments for universality. I will then present new data 
demonstrating how culture has shaped the decoding and transmission of facial expression 
signals. A summary of both sections are presented below.  
Review of the Literature  
To obtain a clear understanding of how the universality hypothesis developed, I will 
present the historical course of the emotion literature, reviewing relevant works supporting 
notions of a ‘universal language of emotion.’ Specifically, I will examine work on the 
recognition of facial expressions across cultures as it constitutes a main component of the 
evidence for universality. First, I will reveal that a number of ‘seminal’ works supporting the 
universality hypothesis are critically flawed, precluding them from further consideration. 
Secondly, by questioning the validity of the statistical criteria used to demonstrate ‘universal 
recognition,’ I will show that long-standing claims of universality are both misleading and 
unsubstantiated. On a related note, I will detail the creation of the ‘universal’ facial expression 
stimulus set (Facial Action Coding System1-FACS- coded facial expressions) to reveal that it is 
in fact a biased, culture-specific representation of Western facial expressions of emotion. The 
implications for future cross-cultural work are discussed in relation to the limited FACS-coded 
stimulus set.  
Experimental Work  
 In reviewing the literature, I will reveal a latent phenomenon which has so far remained 
unexplained – the East Asian (EA) recognition deficit. Specifically, EA observers consistently 
perform significantly poorer when categorising certain ‘universal’ facial expressions compared 
                                                 
1 The Facial Action Coding System (FACS) is a system designed to measure all visible facial behaviour as described 
by reference to functionally anatomical facial muscle movements called Action Units or AUs. 
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to Western Caucasian (WC) observers – a surprisingly neglected finding given the importance of 
emotion communication for human social interaction. To address this neglected issue, I 
examined both the decoding and transmission of facial expression signals in WC and EA 
observers. 
Experiment 1: Cultural Decoding of ‘Universal’ Facial Expressions of Emotion  
To examine the decoding of ‘universal’ facial expressions across cultures, I used eye 
tracking technology to record the eye movements of WC and EA observers while they 
categorised the 6 ‘universal’ facial expressions of emotion. My behavioural results demonstrate 
the robustness of the phenomenon by replicating the EA recognition deficit (i.e., EA observers 
are significantly poorer at recognizing facial expressions of ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’). Further 
inspection of the data also showed that EA observers systematically miscategorise ‘fear’ as 
‘surprise’ and ‘disgust’ as ‘anger.’ Using spatio-temporal analyses of fixations, I will show that 
WC and EA observers use culture-specific fixation strategies to decode ‘universal’ facial 
expressions of emotion. Specifically, while WC observers distribute fixations across the face, 
sampling the eyes and mouth, EA observers persistently bias fixations towards the eyes and 
neglect critical features, especially for facial expressions eliciting significant confusion (i.e., 
‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ and ‘anger’).  
My behavioural data showed that EA observers systematically miscategorise ‘fear’ as 
‘surprise’ and ‘disgust’ as ‘anger.’ Analysis of my eye movement data also showed that EA 
observers repetitively sample information from the eye region during facial expression decoding, 
particularly for those eliciting significant behavioural confusions (i.e., ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ and 
‘anger’). To objectively examine whether the EA culture-specific fixation pattern could give rise 
to the reported behavioural confusions, I built a model observer that samples information from 
the face to categorise facial expressions. Using this model observer, I will show that the EA 
decoding strategy is inadequate to distinguish ‘fear’ from ‘surprise’ and ‘disgust’ from ‘anger,’ 
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thus giving rise to the reported EA behavioural confusions. For the first time, I will reveal the 
origins of a latent phenomenon - the EA recognition deficit. I discuss the implications of culture-
specific decoding strategies during facial expression categorization in light of current theories of 
cross-cultural emotion communication.  
Experiment 2: Cultural Internal Representations of Facial Expressions of Emotion 
In the previous two experiments, I presented data that questions the universality of facial 
expressions. As replicated in Experiment 1, WC and EA observers differ significantly in their 
recognition performance for certain ‘universal’ facial expressions. In Experiment 1, I showed 
culture-specific fixation patterns, demonstrating cultural differences in the predicted locations of 
diagnostic information. Together, these data predict cultural specificity in facial expression 
signals, supporting notions of cultural ‘accents’ and/or ‘dialects.’ To examine whether facial 
expression signals differ across cultures, I used a powerful reverse correlation (RC) technique to 
reveal the internal representations of the 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions of emotion in WC and EA 
observers. Using complementary statistical image processing techniques to examine the signal 
properties of each internal representation, I will directly reveal cultural specificity in the 
representations of the 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions of emotion. Specifically, I will show that while 
WC representations of facial expressions predominantly featured the eyebrows and mouth, EA 
representations were biased towards the eyes, as predicted by my eye movement data in 
Experiment 1. I will also show gaze avoidance as unique feature of the EA group.  
In sum, this data shows clear cultural contrasts in facial expression signals by showing 
that culture shapes the internal representations of emotion.  
Future Work  
My review of the literature will show that pivotal concepts such as ‘recognition’ and 
‘universality’ are currently flawed and have misled both the interpretation of empirical work the 
direction of theoretical developments. Here, I will examine each concept in turn and propose 
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more accurate criteria with which to demonstrate ‘universal recognition’ in future studies. In 
doing so, I will also detail possible future studies designed to address current gaps in knowledge 
created by use of inappropriate criteria. On a related note, having questioned the validity of 
FACS-coded facial expressions as ‘universal’ facial expressions, I will highlight an area for 
empirical development – the creation of a culturally valid facial expression stimulus set – and 
detail future work required to address this question. Finally, I will discuss broader areas of 
interest (i.e., lexical structure of emotion) which could elevate current knowledge of cross-
cultural facial expression recognition and emotion communication in the future. 
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categories (i.e., ‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger,’ ‘sad’), items in a figure legend (e.g., 
‘WC,’ ‘AG,’ or ‘best fit’), to indicate irony (e.g., ‘universal,’ ‘instinctual’ or ‘basic’) or to 
distance the author from terms coined by others (e.g., cultural ‘accents,’ or ‘display rules’).     
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1. General Introduction  
Facial expressions of emotion have long been a source of wonderment and fascination 
amongst philosophers, anthropologists, psychologists, physicians and more recently engineers, 
physicists and computer scientists. Central to all human social interaction is the mutual 
understanding of emotion, achieved primarily by the exchange of a set of potent social signals –
facial expressions of emotion. Given that various scientific fields have contributed to current 
knowledge of facial expressions, it is useful to track the historical course of emotion literature to 
obtain a clear understanding of the theoretical and empirical positions of today.  
1.1 The Anatomy of Facial Expressions – a Gift from God 
Early research on facial expressions focused primarily on describing the anatomical 
mechanisms subserving the production of facial expressions. The noted anatomist, Sir Charles 
Bell, was amongst the first to extensively examine the musculature of the face, producing 
detailed illustrations and cataloging the involvement of specific muscles in the expression of 
different emotions(e.g., Bell, 1844; see also Henle, 1868). Consequently, in his celebrated works 
Guillaume Duchenne stimulated specific combinations of muscles via faradic (non-convulsive) 
shocks delivered to the face to capture ‘true’ facial expressions on photographic film for the first 
time (Duchenne, 1862-1990). While not primarily concerned with the origins of facial 
expressions, Bell and Duchenne proposed that God had bestowed man with facial muscles solely 
for the purposes of emotion communication, which were to be used in accordance with the God-
given language of facial expressions. Although quite inadvertently, their views on the origins of 
facial expressions of emotion stirred doubt in the mind of one the most influential scientists – 
Charles Darwin.  
1.2 The Origins of Facial Expressions – Darwin’s Legacy 
Unconvinced that facial expressions are simply arbitrary muscular patterns given by God 
for the sole purpose of emotion communication, Darwin aimed to reveal the true origins of facial 
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expressions in his seminal works, ‘The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals’ 
(Darwin, 1999/1872). Here, he directly asked the question ‘why?’ for the first time. That is, why 
do facial expressions take on their distinctive form? For example, why is the emotion ‘disgust’ 
accompanied by a raised top lip, wrinkled nose and narrowing of the eyes, whereas ‘fear’ is 
associated with wide opened eyes, raised eyebrows and flared nostrils (see Figure 1.1, Panel A 
for an example)? Why should these apparently arbitrary facial patterns accompany different 
internal emotions?  
1.2.1 Facial Expressions as Sensory Regulators 
In observing that primates of human ancestry possessed facial muscles and facial 
expressions similar to those of humans (see also Andrew, 1963), Darwin surmised that facial 
expressions may have developed to perform some adaptive function when humans “existed in a 
much lower and animal-like condition” (Darwin, 1999/1872, pg 19). For example, all facial 
expressions involve the contraction of specific facial muscles, which can either enhance or 
diminish sensory input. Consider the facial expression ‘disgust,’ which is characterized by a 
raised top lip, wrinkled nose, narrowing of the eyes and lowered eyebrows (see Figure 1.1, Panel 
B for an example).  
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Figure 1.1 Examples of the Facial Expressions Typically Associated with the Internal 
Emotions of ‘fear’ and ‘disgust.’ Panel A: Displays a showing an example of the facial 
expression typically associated with the internal emotion ‘fear.’ Note the characteristic wide 
opened eyes, raised eyebrows, wrinkles brow, opened mouth and flared nostrils. Panel B: The 
face displayed shows an example of the facial expression typically associated with the internal 
emotion ‘disgust.’ Note the characteristic raised top lip, wrinkled nose and narrowing of the 
eyes. I selected both examples from the Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion 
(JACFEE) stimulus set (Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988).  
 
In Panel A above, the face image depicts the external facial expression associated with the 
internal emotion ‘fear.’ Note the characteristic wide opened eyes, raised eyebrows, wrinkles 
brow, opened mouth and flared nostrils. The face image in Panel B shows an example of the 
facial expression representing the internal emotion ‘disgust.’ Note the characteristic raised top 
lip, wrinkled nose and narrowing of the eyes. Both facial expression examples are sourced from 
the Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion (JACFEE) stimulus set (Matsumoto 
& Ekman, 1988).  
Together, these specific patterns of muscular contractions perform a number of useful 
functions – while raising the top lip and wrinkling the nose blocks the nasal passage, thus 
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reducing olfactory stimulation, narrowing the eyes and lowering the brow not only offers 
protection to the eye but also diminishes the field of view and thus visual stimulation (Andrew, 
1963; Susskind, et al., 2008). In addition, the facial expression of ‘disgust’ may also include the 
protrusion of the tongue or gaping, which facilitates the expulsion of any unpleasant items from 
the mouth (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Under circumstances of potential contamination (e.g., close 
proximity to a decomposing body dispersing pathogens), the facial expression of ‘disgust’ is 
indeed an effective strategy for rejecting noxious contaminants (Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, 
Lowery, & Ebert, 1994) as it protects the regions most vulnerable to the entry of pathogens (i.e., 
eyes, nose and mouth).  
Similarly, the facial expression typically associated with the emotion ‘fear’ also 
facilitates adaptive action, but by providing quite the opposite sensory experience. As shown in 
Figure 1.1, Panel A, the characteristic facial expression of ‘fear’ involves raised eyebrows, wide 
opened eyes and flared nostrils. In this case, raising the eyebrows and opening the eyes wide 
increases the visual field, thus enhancing visual input, while flaring the nostrils increases the 
capacity of the nasal passage and thus nasal inspiration (Andrew, 1963; Susskind, et al., 2008). 
In circumstances where a threat is in close proximity, the facial expression of ‘fear’ facilitates 
adaptive action (i.e., escape) by increasing visual information (e.g., identifying escape route 
options) and the input of oxygen (e.g., optimizing muscle function). Similar examination of each 
of the other ‘basic’ facial expressions (i.e., ‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’) has revealed a 
plausible biological function for each (Andrew, 1963; Susskind, et al., 2008), thus answering the 
original question, “why do facial expressions take on their distinctive form?” 
1.2.2 Facial Expressions as a Physiological Reaction 
With strong support for the biological and evolutionary origins of facial expressions, 
facial expressions were largely considered an innate, reflexive behaviour, appearing in 
conjunction with various other physiological responses during particular emotional states. 
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Conceiving of facial expressions more as a physiological response, rather than a social signal per 
se, various studies catalogued the behavioural and physiological responses elicited during 
emotional arousal. For example, in his startlingly unethical study, Studies of Emotional 
Reactions: General Behaviour and Facial Expressions, Landis (Landis, 1924) examined 
modulations in the blood pressure, heart rate and facial expressions of participants during 
emotional arousal elicited by external provocation (e.g., detonating fire crackers under naïve 
participants, forcibly instructing the decapitation of a rat). By capturing facial expressions with a 
camera (see also Feleky 1916), Landis was able to capture and systematically described facial 
responses with reference to the solicitation of facial certain muscles. Cannon also famously 
described and documented a wide variety of physiological change associated with emotional 
arousal (Cannon, 1915). More recent research continues to demonstrate the relevance of 
physiological reaction during emotional experience. For example, when confronted with facial 
expressions, observers show distinct neurophysiological (Philippe G. Schyns, Petro, & Smith, 
2009), autonomic and facial reactions (Dimberg, 1982) even during subconscious presentation of 
stimuli (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000).  
1.2.3 Facial Expressions as Social Signals 
If facial expressions originally served to regulate sensory exposure as a reflexive action, 
how then did facial expressions evolve as social signals? To answer this question, it is important 
to consider the inherent qualities of facial expressions that give them a natural advantage for 
communicating information.  
(a) Signaling Qualities of Facial Expressions  
By virtue of their specific biological function and pattern of muscular activation, each 
facial expression constitutes a different and complex visual pattern (e.g., note in Figure 1.1 the 
visual dissimilarity between ‘fear’ in Panel A and ‘disgust’ in Panel B). Each complex visual 
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pattern is composed of ‘basic’ components of information – spatial frequencies2 of varying 
contrasts and orientations. Importantly, the human visual brain is particularly sensitive to these 
features. For example, populations of cells in V1 (primary visual cortex) are maximally sensitive 
to specific spatial frequencies (De Valois, De Valois, & Yund, 1979; Maffei & Fiorentini, 1973), 
therefore acting as decoders to decompose incoming images into spatial frequency (see Sowden 
& Schyns, 2006). Given the sensitivity of the brain to these features, each complex pattern (i.e., 
facial expression) is easily discriminated by the human visual system (e.g., Philippe G. Schyns, 
et al., 2009) and is therefore recognizable – an essential feature of any effective signal. 
Secondly, the ‘basic’ components (i.e., different spatial frequencies) of facial expressions 
perform another useful function – transmitting information over different distances. While lower 
spatial frequency features (i.e., the large-scale smiling mouth in ‘happy’) are visible across a 
wide range of viewing distances, higher spatial frequency information (i.e., the fine-scale 
wrinkles on the nose in ‘disgust’) are only visible at closer viewing distances. Depending on the 
function of the facial expression, it is likely that the features relevant for accurate recognition 
(i.e., 'diagnostic recognition.' See M. L. Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005) evolved to 
posses certain visual characteristics that enable the transmission of information over longer or 
shorter viewing distances. For example, the facial expression of ‘disgust’ indicates the presence 
of a proximal threat (e.g., decomposing carcass dispersing pathogens with limited trajectory), 
thus requiring visibility over short rather than long viewing distances (i.e., at longer distances, 
the threat would pose no risk to the observer). Indeed, accurate recognition of ‘disgust’ facial 
expressions relies on the fine-scale wrinkles around the nose, thus requiring a proximal rather 
than distal viewing distance (F. W. Smith & Schyns, 2009). Thus, while originally serving to 
regulate sensory exposure, facial expression signals are likely to have co-evolved with and the 
corresponding neural sensitivities of the brain in response to additional environmental pressures 
                                                 
2 Here, spatial frequency is measured in cycles per degree (CPD) of visual angle.  
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(e.g., effective group communication of threat), creating an optimal system of signaling and 
decoding (Philippe G. Schyns, et al., 2009). 
(b) Informational Content of Facial Expressions 
As mentioned above, facial expressions have an inherent ability to communicate 
information between humans by virtue of their distinctive appearance and visibility by the 
human visual system. Although primarily serving to modulate sensory experience, Darwin 
surmised that through habit and association, facial expressions would be elicited during 
emotional arousal even though its functional role may not be necessary. As a result, rather than 
simply reflecting the conditions of the environment per se, facial expression would reliably 
indicate internal emotional states, howsoever elicited. Thus, while originally designed to benefit 
the expresser, facial expressions also provide a rich source of information for the observer – 
another trait that natural selection is likely to have favoured. At this point, it is worthwhile 
considering the various types of information facial expression signals provide. Here, I will detail 
3 types of information facial expressions provide – environmental conditions, behavioural 
intentions of the expresser, and appropriate behavioural response. To illustrate the point, I will 
use the ‘negative’ facial expressions (i.e., ‘fear,’ ‘anger,’ ‘disgust’ and ‘sad’) as they provide 
excellent examples of the rich informational content of facial expression signals.  
c) Environmental Conditions  
As mentioned previously, facial expressions can reflect information about the current 
conditions of the environment. Consider each of the ‘negative’ facial expressions – ‘fear,’ 
‘anger,’ ‘disgust’ and ‘sad.’ While all conveying negative information (i.e., presence of some 
kind of threat), each provides information about the nature of the threat. For example, ‘fear’ 
conveys that the threat (e.g., predatory tiger) is in close proximity and immediate, whereas 
‘disgust’ reflects that while a threat is present (e.g., decomposing body dispersing pathogens), it 
is relatively less mobile. ‘Anger,’ on the other hand reveals the precise source of the proximal 
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threat (i.e., the expresser), whereas ‘sad’ shows that the threat is likely to be distal and/or non-
life threatening (e.g., the death of a relative).  
d) Behavioural Intentions of the Expresser 
Similarly, facial expressions can also provide predictive information about the likely 
behavioural intentions of the expresser, adding more information about the environmental 
conditions. For example, a facial expression of ‘fear’ indicates that the expresser is likely to 
adopt a flight, fight or freeze response to the immediate threat, whereas a facial expression of 
‘disgust’ shows that the expresser will avoid the threat but do so with less immediacy. In 
contrast, ‘anger’ shows that the expresser intends to attack those who do not heed their warning, 
while ‘sad’ indicates that the expresser is unthreatening, vulnerable and will perhaps seek 
consolation.  
e) Appropriate Behavioural Response 
In all instances mentioned above, each facial expression provides different information 
about the behavioural intentions of the expresser and/or the current environmental conditions, 
which then allows observers to choose an appropriate behavioural response. For example, a 
facial expression of ‘fear’ indicates that a quick flight, fight or freeze response is required for 
survival, whereas ‘disgust’ shows that a less immediate and energy consuming avoidance 
response is required. In both cases, the observer is likely to mirror the behaviour of the 
expresser3. In contrast, ‘anger’ indicates that the observer should quickly avoid the expresser if 
they wish to avoid a harmful attack, whereas a facial expression of ‘sad’ shows that the observer 
should approach to offer consolation. In these cases, the observer’s behavioural response is 
                                                 
3 Here, I have used an example that reflects visceral (e.g., any entity dispersing pathogens), rather than moral (e.g., 
any violation of a moral or ethical code) ‘disgust.’ While both visceral and moral ‘disgust’ are represented by 
similar facial expressions (see Rozin, et al., 1994 for modulations in 'Disgust' facial expressions), the consequences 
for the observer’s behaviour and cognitions are likely to differ. Consider a situation in which the observer is the 
source of moral ‘disgust.’ Here, the ‘disgust’ facial expression represents a rejection of the observer due to their 
distasteful acts. In response, the observer is less likely to mirror the actions of the expresser as in the case of visceral 
‘disgust’ , but is instead more likely to choose an avoidance behaviour. The avoidance response can be enhanced if 
desired by blending ‘disgust’ with ‘anger,’ (which moral and ethical violations tend to arouse) commonly referred to 
as ‘contempt.’ 
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directly related to the likely intentions of the expresser rather than any other third-party external 
threat or stimulus.  
With such a large and various amount of information available in a single signal, coupled 
with inherent visual signalling qualities, facial expressions are indeed a prime candidate to 
evolve as strong social signals. Given the highly adaptive role of facial expressions and their 
ability to increase the chances of survival (e.g., by rejecting noxious contaminants), any trait 
facilitating the production and recognition of facial expressions would be passed on to the next 
generation by natural selection. Thus, Darwin argued that facial expressions are innate and 
evolved human behaviours, which have retained the original configuration of muscle 
contractions that originally served to regulate sensory experience. Darwin’s theory of the 
evolutionary development of facial expressions is further supported by cross-species similarity in 
facial expressions (e.g., Andrew, 1963; Vick, Waller, Parr, Smith Pasqualini, & Bard, 2007), 
which demonstrates a link between human facial expressions and primitive behaviours. 
Furthermore, neonates and infants have been shown to produce discernable facial expressions 
such as ‘disgust’ (Rozin & Fallon, 1987), ‘surprise’ and ‘happy’ (e.g., Hiatt, Campos, & Emde, 
1979), supporting the view that facial expressions are innate and not entirely socially learned.  
1.3 The Influence of Culture on Facial Expressions – Anthropological Observations from 
Across the World  
With the strong biological and evolutionary origins of facial expressions, notions of 
universality became a widespread working assumption with little or no cross-cultural research 
conducted or deemed necessary. For example, some of the first facial expression recognition 
studies (e.g., Buzby, 1924; Feleky, 1914; Goodenough & Tinker, 1931; Munn, 1940) did not 
consider cultural or racial factors as a potential source of variation since facial expression were 
assumed to be universal on the basis of their evolutionary origins. Thus, facial expressions were 
largely considered to be the biologically hard-wired ‘universal language of emotion.’ 
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Yet, with increasing knowledge of human behaviour within different cultures, notions of 
universality and the idea of ‘basic human nature’ became a source of fervent debate. From the 
Amazon to Zanzibar, anthropological observations detailed marked and surprising cultural 
differences in behaviours widely assumed to be innate. One of the most striking differences 
reported was in the use of gestures widely believed to be ‘natural’ such as pointing, conveying 
‘yes’ and ‘no’ and greeting customs. For example, nodding the head to indicate ‘yes’ and 
shaking the head laterally to signify ‘no’ was largely accepted as an instinctual, biological and 
therefore universal human behaviour (see Holt, 1931). However, anthropological observations 
provide a multitude of examples, which contradicted this view. For example, while the 
Bengalese rock their heads from shoulder to shoulder to indicate agreement, in Borneo raising 
the eyebrows is used to achieve the same function and in Northern Japan, hand rather than head 
gestures are used to convey ‘yes’ and ‘no’ (see also Labarre, 1947; D. Morris, 1979). With such 
diversity in human behaviour considered to be ‘natural,’ these observations invited caution in 
assuming that any human behaviour is biologically hard-wired and universal. Rather, these 
examples highlight that many social behaviours are learned and therefore determined by culture.  
Given that facial expressions, like gestures, are used primarily to convey information 
during social interaction, many reasonably considered that culture could shape facial expression 
signals in the same way. Indeed, numerous colourful descriptions of differences in the expression 
of emotion across cultures demonstrate the immense power of culture in shaping these so-called 
biologically hard-wired behaviours. One of the most cogent examples of culture-specific 
displays of emotional expression is documented by the explorer and historian, John Turnbull 
who observed a particularly unusual greeting ritual in Tahiti. He reports that after a long 
separation, the Tahitians greeted each other by “…taking a shark's tooth, [and] strik[ing] it into 
their head and temples with great violence, so as to produce a copious bleeding, and this they 
will repeat, till they become clotted with blood and gore” (Turnbull, 1813, pg. 301-302). Left 
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with only complete incomprehension as to the origins or symbolic relevance of this ritual, he 
could only conclude that such behaviour intended to “…express the excess of their joy” (pg. 
302). While this is of course a strikingly odd example of emotional expression (at least to non-
Tahitians at that time) used to illustrate the point, it is by no means an isolated finding. Many 
other examples of culture-specific emotional expressions have been reported, causing as much 
confusion as that experienced by John Turnbull on the shores of Tahiti. For example, the 
Japanese smile is used not simply to convey joy, but is used primarily as a social courtesy to 
mask external displays of negative emotions such as fear or sad, much to the confusion and 
distress of Westerner observers (see Hearn, 1894 for examples). Similarly, laughter is used to 
express a variety of other incongruent emotions such as surprise, embarrassment and even 
discomfort in certain areas of Africa (Gorer, 1935). The Utku (Utkuhikhalingmiut) Eskimos of 
Northwest Canada consider outward expressions of anger to be childish and external 
manifestations of the internal state are typically masked with a neutral expression (Briggs, 1970). 
In contrast, an American Indian tribe, the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma encourages the enthusiastic 
outward expression of emotion during specific events, even when the internal emotion is absent. 
For example, LaBarre (1947) describes Mary Buffalo, a Kiowa member, at the funeral of her 
brother whom she has not seen in a long time and was not particularly close – “…she wept in a 
frenzy, tore her hair, scratched her cheeks, and even tried to jump into the grave…” (Labarre, 
1947, page 55). After observing her cheerful and calm behaviour immediately afterwards, 
LaBarre concludes that he has witnessed Mary Buffalo acting as any decent Kiowa woman 
would do at a funeral. 
With such diversity in the expression of emotions across cultures, it was argued that 
while facial expressions may have a biological basis, culture so heavily influences their use that 
facial expressions no longer necessarily convey the same meaning across all cultures. Thus, 
many anthropologists rejected notions of a ‘universal language of emotion,’ stating that facial 
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expressions are socially learned and not instinctual as initially believed. With such apparently 
contradictory accounts of the nature of facial expressions (i.e., biological vs. cultural basis), and 
some even arguing that facial expressions are entirely socially learned (Klineberg, 1940; 
Labarre, 1947; Mead, 1975), opinion was largely divided, sparking controversy in the field.  
1.4 Fusing Biology and Culture - A ‘Neuro-Cultural’ Theory of Facial Expressions of 
Emotion  
In light of to the apparently contradictory nature-nurture components of facial 
expressions and ensuing debate, theoretical developments (Ekman, 1972; Tomkins, 1962, 1963; 
Tomkins & McCarter, 1964) emerged to account for the interactive influences of biology and 
culture on the production of facial expressions. Here, I will describe the ‘neuro-cultural’ theory 
of facial expressions developed by Paul Ekman (Ekman, 1972), which built on an earlier theory 
introduced by Tomkins (Tomkins, 1962, 1963). The ‘neuro-cultural’ theory of facial expressions 
is composed of a series of stages where either biology or cultural factors influence the production 
of facial expressions. Although the theory includes descriptions of cultural differences in the 
elicitors of emotion (e.g., spouse taking a secondary wife) and the consequences of displaying 
certain facial expressions (e.g., feeling guilty in response to initial emotional state), I will detail 
two stages most relevant to this thesis – the biological starting point of facial expression 
production (i.e., the innate Facial Affect Programme) and the influence of culture-specific norms 
on subsequent external displays of facial expressions (i.e., display rules).  
1.4.1 The Facial Affect Programme  
Largely influenced by the evolutionary origins of facial expressions, the ‘neuro-cultural’ 
framework proposes that facial expressions are generated by an innate, sub-cortical Facial Affect 
Programme, (Tomkins, 1962, 1963), which originally served as an adaptive mechanism to 
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regulate sensory exposure. Specifically, each primary4 emotion (i.e., ‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ 
‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’) is thought to be accompanied by a distinct pattern of neural impulses 
sent to specific facial muscles, thus producing a characteristic facial expression. At this stage of 
production, a facial expression is largely considered to be one of the many reflexive, 
physiological responses produced during emotional arousal, such as increased pulse rate, 
perspiration and so forth. Given that the proposed Facial Affect Programme is a primitive and 
innate system, the distinct patterns of neural impulses sent to the facial muscles would be the 
same across all humans, regardless of culture. In other words, the Facial Affect Programme is a 
universal human feature, generating emotion-specific neural impulses to the facial muscles.  
1.4.2 Display rules 
The next stage of facial expression production details the operation of culture-specific 
display rules, which can interfere with the full expression of so-called ‘instinctual’ facial 
expressions of emotion (i.e., those generated by the Facial Affect Programme). display rules are 
described as socially learned management techniques, which govern when, how and to whom 
facial expressions ought to be displayed. For example, although a Western male feels ‘sad’ 
during a funeral, cultural norms dictate that he should refrain from displaying any signs of ‘sad’ 
in public and instead maintain a more neutral, emotionless expression. Here, he would adhere to 
the cultural ‘display rule’ by diminishing any facial signs of ‘sad’ and replacing the ‘instinctual’ 
facial expression (i.e., ‘sad’) with a more ‘neutral’ one. Similarly, the same scenario in Japan 
would result in the Japanese male masking internal feeling of ‘sad’ but by displaying a ‘happy’ 
facial expression in order to avoid making others feel uncomfortable by his ‘sad’ and preserving 
group harmony. 
                                                 
4 Here, ‘primary’ emotions are considered to be irreducible and are therefore alternatively referred to as ‘basic’ 
emotions. Similar to primary colours, ‘primary’ emotions can be combined to produce ‘blended’ emotions (Ekman, 
1972). For example, smugness can be described as a combination of happiness and ‘anger’ , whereas jealousy 
comprises ‘anger’ and ‘sad’ ness.  
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As illustrated in the examples above, the operation of display rules elicits a secondary 
modulation in the facial muscles to diminish, enhance, mask or replace the initial pattern of 
neural impulses (i.e., the instinctual facial expression generated by the Facial Affect Programme) 
as appropriate. As a result, the facial expression produced may not necessarily reflect the 
emotion experienced (e.g., displaying a ‘happy’ facial expression when feeling ‘sad’). 
Depending on the intensity of the internal emotion, diminishing, enhancing, masking or 
replacing the ‘instinctual’ facial expression can be achieved with varying degrees of success. 
Consider that the Western male attending the funeral is overcome with grief and ‘sad.’ While the 
social norm of “putting on a brave face” has been ingrained since childhood, the intensity of the 
emotion experienced may be too great, and any attempt to conceal the ‘instinctual’ facial 
expression of ‘sad’ may be less than successful. As a result, some facial signs of the emotion 
experienced would ‘leak,’ producing a facial expression that contains recognizable or contorted 
aspects of the instinctual facial expression. However, with some display rules learned from an 
early age (e.g., to smile when greeting people), the interference process could become habitual, 
requiring less cognitive processing compared to those less frequency used (e.g., smiling when 
losing a game) enabling quick and precise operation under most circumstances. Thus, culture-
specific display rules can interfere with the external display of ‘instinctual’ facial expressions of 
emotion, resulting in cultural differences in the facial expressions displayed during the same 
emotional experience (e.g., ‘happy’ or ‘neutral’ facial expression while feeling ‘sad’). 
Here, the ‘neuro-cultural’ theory details the contribution of both biological (i.e., 
universal) and cultural factors in the production of facial expressions to account for the reported 
cultural differences in the display of facial expressions. They argue that it is the innate Facial 
Affect Programme and emotion-specific neural impulses that are universal and that the reported 
cultural differences in facial expressions are simply a reflection of socially learned, culture-
specific ‘display rules.’ That is, in the absence of any culture-specific display rules, all humans 
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would display the same ‘instinctual’ facial expressions as generated by the Facial Affect 
Programme. Yet, while providing a plausible theoretical account of facial expressions and their 
modulating factors, in the absence of any empirical work, the universality debate remained 
unresolved.  
1.5 Empirical Evidence from Cross-Cultural Recognition Studies  
 With increasing debate on whether facial expressions are innate (and therefore universal) 
or socially learned, a landslide of empirical research dedicated to unraveling the nature-nurture 
debate ensued. The rest, they say, is history, but it is imperative that we now return to this 
historical turning point, which shaped the future of emotion research and the knowledge of 
today.  
It was argued that the reported cultural differences in facial expressions could be due to 
the operation of culture specific display rules and/or the observations of facial expressions used 
during social interaction (i.e., gestural facial expressions) rather than those associated with the 
emotion-specific pattern of neural impulses delivered to the facial muscles (i.e., ‘instinctual’ 
facial expressions) as proposed in the ‘neuro-cultural’ framework. In distinguishing between 
these two types of facial expressions, current studies aimed to demonstrate the presence of 
‘instinctual’ facial expressions in support of the university hypothesis. Rather than attempting to 
elicit specific emotions and record the subsequent uninhibited facial expressions (e.g., Landis, 
1924), it was reasoned that recognition studies could be used to show pan cultural elements of 
facial expressions. The rationale behind using recognition studies was that while culture could 
modulate the production of facial expressions via display rules, the same ‘instinctual’ facial 
expressions would still occur in every culture. For example, on the one hand, where display rules 
are not yet learned (e.g., in early childhood) or fail to operate (e.g., when emotional experience is 
overwhelming) ‘instinctual’ facial expressions would be displayed. As a result, all ‘instinctual’ 
facial expressions would be recognizable by all humans, regardless of culture. On the other hand, 
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if facial expressions were entirely socially learned and culture-specific, the unique facial 
expressions generated in one culture would be completely incomprehensible to those in another 
culture, resulting in a complete lack of agreement about their meaning.  
With this rationale, scholars such as Ekman and Izard conducted a series of cross-cultural 
recognition studies involving observers in various distinct cultures. By presenting observers in 
the USA, Brazil, Japan, New Guinea and Borneo with facial expressions posed by USA posers, 
the studies showed that all observer groups could recognize all 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions of 
emotion (i.e., ‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger,’ and ‘sad’) at above chance 
performance (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969). With findings replicated across various other 
distinct cultures (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1971) the authors concluded that facial expressions 
are the ‘universal language of emotion.’  
1.6 Challenging Notions of a ‘Universal Language of Emotion’ - A Closer Look at the 
Data  
Although work from scholars such as Ekman and Izard are cited as irrefutable evidence 
for the universality of facial expressions, the criteria used to demonstrate ‘universal recognition’ 
is flawed, subsequently masking notable cross-cultural differences in the recognition of facial 
expressions. To reveal these flaws, I will examine the main studies that have reported ‘universal 
recognition’ of facial expressions and discuss the implications of their results. Before I do so, it 
is important to first highlight the so-called seminal works that cannot be included for further 
consideration due to failure to meet basic research criteria. Each study is detailed below, 
accompanied by the reasons for their exclusion from this thesis.  
1.6.1 Empirical Studies Excluded from Further Consideration 
1. Constants Across Cultures in the Face and Emotion. (Ekman & Friesen, 1971).  
 In this study, the authors showed that both WC and South Fore of New Guinea 
observers could accurately recognize facial expressions posed by members of the other cultural 
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group. While cited in a large number of published papers (Ekman, 1972; Ekman, et al., 1987; 
Ekman, Rolls, Perrett, & Ellis, 1992) in support of the universality hypothesis, this study suffers 
from two noteworthy deficits. First, the South Fore performed a 3 Alternative Forced Choice 
(AFC) categorization task whereby observers indicated which of 3 facial expressions best 
represented the emotion conveyed by a story read to them. With such a limited design of only 3 
choices, performance most closely reflects a simple discrimination task (A-not-A) rather than 
recognition per se. Furthermore, observers were presented with an uneven distribution of 
emotion combination conditions (e.g., facial expressions of ‘disgust’ were only paired with 
‘surprise’ and ‘sad’ while ‘happy’ was paired with all other facial expressions), which can invite 
spurious inconsistencies in the data. Secondly, while being mentioned in passing in the above 
published paper (Ekman & Friesen, 1971), data detailing a task where WC observers recognized 
posed facial expressions of the South Fore did not undergo peer review, appearing only as 
conference proceedings (Ekman, 1968). 
2(a) Facial Behaviour and Stress in Two Cultures (Ekman, Lazarus, Opton, Friesen, & 
Averill, 1970).  
2(b) Cultural Differences in Facial Expressions in a Social Situation: An Experimental Test 
of the Concept of Display Rules (Friesen, 1972).  
In above 2 studies, the authors examined the influence of culture-specific display rules on 
the production of facial expressions by recording WC and EA participants while watching 
stressful films either alone or in company (i.e., when an experimenter was present). While both 
WC and EA participants freely expressed emotion when alone, only EA participants tended to 
mask negative facial expressions (e.g., ‘disgust’) when in company. Although cited in a number 
of published papers (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, et al., 1992) supporting the 
universality of facial expressions and the operation of culture-specific display rules on facial 
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expression production, the work of (2a) lacks peer review publication, with the work of (2b) 
constituting an unpublished doctoral dissertation.  
1.6.2 Criteria Used to Demonstrate ‘Universal Recognition’ is Flawed  
Since the inception of cross-cultural facial expression recognition studies, 6 ‘basic’ facial 
expressions of emotion are reported to be universally recognized (e.g., Ekman, et al., 1969). At 
this juncture, it is important to understand how the literature has so far defined ‘universal 
recognition.’ As summarized by Matsumoto, “…universal recognition [is] demonstrated by two 
criteria: first, that [recognition accuracy is] significantly greater than chance; and second, that the 
percentage [is] greater than an arbitrary level, usually 70%, across all cultures” (Matsumoto, 
1992, pg. 72). Yet, these criteria are critically flawed for two reasons. 
a) Insensitive Criteria Generates Type II errors  
These criteria are misleading because they mask the systematic cultural differences reported 
in all such cross-cultural recognition studies (Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Ekman, et al., 
1987; Ekman, et al., 1969; Jack, Blais, Scheepers, Schyns, & Caldara, 2009; Matsumoto, 1992; 
Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Moriguchi, et al., 2005). For example, while WC observers 
recognize all 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions with high accuracy (typically >85% for all 
expressions), other cultural groups perform significantly poorer for certain facial expressions 
such as ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘fear’ (Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, 
et al., 1969; Jack, et al., 2009; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989). Figure 1.2 below 
illustrates the variation in facial expression recognition performance across cultures using data 
extracted from various well-known cross-cultural facial expression recognition studies (Biehl, et 
al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, et al., 1969; Jack, et al., 2009; Matsumoto, 
1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989).  
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Figure 1.2 Mean Recognition Accuracy of Facial Expressions of Emotion Across Cultures.  
Colour-coded circles presented on geographical regions of the world map represent the mean 
recognition accuracy (%) of observers from that geographical region when categorising facial 
expressions of emotion. Each colour-coded circle corresponds to represents one of the 6 facial 
expressions (not indicated) where recognition accuracy is indicated by a different colour (see key 
on the upper right of the figure, labelled ‘Recognition Accuracy’). For example, recognition 
accuracy for facial expressions of emotion in North America (left most cluster of coloured 
circles) ranges between 100% (red) and 70% (yellow) accuracy whereas in New Guinea (right 
most and lower cluster of coloured circles), accuracy ranges from 100% (red) to 30% (purple). 
The data points (i.e., colour-coded circles) presented here are extracted from various well-known 
studies (Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, et al., 1969; Jack, et al., 
2009; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989). 
 
b) Above Chance Performance Does Not Reflect ‘Normal’ Human Recognition  
Defining that ‘recognition’ is demonstrated by above chance performance (i.e., 14%-16% 
accuracy, depending on a 6AFC or 7AFC task) is completely inappropriate as it does not 
accurately reflect ‘normal’ human recognition (e.g., the clinical definition of ‘normal’ human 
recognition would be at least 75% accuracy; see Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). Indeed, it can 
easily be argued that many cultures failed to even achieve recognition at all (i.e., note in Figure 
1.2 the number of yellow, green, blue(s), purple and even black circles in the Eastern countries). 
It is also important to point out that although finding clear variation in recognition accuracy 
across cultures (from 100% to 30%), the vast majority of studies apparently altered the ‘arbitrary 
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level’ of performance as desired in order to conclude that facial expressions are universally 
recognized (Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, et al., 1969; Jack, et al., 
2009; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989).  
Clearly, such criteria can never be used to demonstrate universal recognition. Rather, 
criteria demonstrating universal recognition would reflect that a) recognition has been achieved 
by all observer groups and that b) performance is comparable (i.e., universal) across all observer 
groups. When more appropriate criteria are applied to the existing data, facial expressions are not 
universally recognized. I will further discuss the development of improved criteria in the 
General Conclusion.  
1.7 Theoretical Accounts of Cultural Variation in Recognition Performance  
As described above, studies showing consistent and significant cultural differences in the 
recognition of facial expressions are indeed numerous, dating back to some of the first cross-
cultural studies (e.g., Ekman, et al., 1969). Although Ekman previously argued that cultural 
differences in recognition performance may be due to methodological errors rather than any real 
cultural difference per se (Ekman, 1994), several reviews of the literature (Elfenbein & N. 
Ambady, 2002; Russell, 1994) have generated discussion and the development of theoretical 
accounts (Elfenbein & N. Ambady, 2002; Elfenbein, Beaupre, Levesque, & Hess, 2007; 
Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989). Primarily, the seminal works of Russell (Russell, 1994) created 
controversy and debate within the field, not only by highlighting a number of methodological 
flaws in the literature, but also by presenting a comprehensive account of emotion as a complex 
social concept, which is malleable to the influences of culture. For example, noting that facial 
expressions are but one of the many dimensions of emotional experience, Russell discusses 
cultural differences in the conceptual nature of emotion. For example, events eliciting the 
emotion ‘anger’ are likely to differ across cultures due to the influence of social norms and rules 
(e.g., husband taking another partner or child refusing to enter marriage at the age of 10 years 
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old). In turn, the experience of ‘anger’ may differ across cultures due to underlying concept of 
the emotion. For example, while some cultures may experience ‘anger’ broadly as high arousal 
displeasure, others may include dimensions of frustration, threat of violence against others and 
determination. Experience of an emotion itself can also trigger other emotions, depending on the 
culture. For example, feelings of ‘anger’ in Eastern culture are typically associated with shame 
and guilt, while Westerners do not experience a secondary emotion in response to the first. In 
sum, Russell presents a comprehensive view of emotion and emotional experience as a partly 
social construct that is therefore influenced by the underlying ideologies of society. As a result, 
he highlights that while emotion has shared biological aspects, culture plays an important role in 
understanding human emotional experience and emotion communication.  
In explaining cultural differences in the recognition of facial expressions, discussion and 
theoretical developments have considered two sources of cultural variation – cultural differences 
in the transmission of facial expressions and cultural differences in the decoding of facial 
expression signals. Here, I will detail both accounts.  
First, it is important to consider how culture could modulate the biologically based skills 
of facial expression transmission and decoding. Examination of the moral, social and political 
ideologies of diverse cultures shows that each embraces a specific conceptual framework of 
beliefs, knowledge and values. Specifically, while Western cultures promote individualistic 
behaviours and attitudes, Eastern cultures value collectivist practices (e.g., Niedenthal, Krauth-
Gruber, & Ric, 2006), which shape thought and action (see Nisbett & Masuda, 2003 for a 
review). 
1.7.1  Transmission of Facial Expression Signals  
With this in mind, it has been argued that Easterners may use culture-specific display 
rules, to actively suppress the public display of certain negative emotions in order to preserve 
group harmony (Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Ekman, et al., 1969). By systematically 
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diminishing the frequency of transmission of certain negative facial expressions, observer 
experience in recognizing negative expressions could decrease, thus giving rise to the reported 
EA recognition deficit (e.g., Biehl, et al., 1997; Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, et al., 1969; Jack, et 
al., 2009; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Moriguchi, et al., 2005).  
It has also been proposed that the ‘basic’ facial expressions could be subject to culture-
specific ‘dialects’ (Elfenbein, Beaupré, Levesque, & Hess, 2007; Tomkins & McCarter, 1964) or 
‘accents’ (Marsh, Elfenbein, & Ambady, 2003), resulting in perceptible variations in the ‘basic’ 
facial expressions. As a result, out-group members would be put at a disadvantage when 
decoding less familiar facial expression ‘accents’ (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003), giving rise to the 
proposed in-group advantage (Elfenbein & N. Ambady, 2002). Indeed, in a clever study, Marsh 
et al. (2003) showed that even standardized (FACS-coded) facial expressions contain cultural 
‘accents,’ which reliably betray the poser’s nationality(Marsh, et al., 2003). Here, observers of 
Japanese nationality were asked to judge the nationality of Japanese nationals and USA born 
Japanese posers. When the posers displayed a ‘neutral’ facial expression, the observers could not 
accurately judge the nationality of the posers. However, when the posers displayed a facial 
expression (i.e., ‘disgust,’ ‘fear,’ ‘sad,’ or ‘surprise’), observers were significantly better at 
judging their nationality. While the results of this study demonstrate that these ‘universal’ facial 
expressions contain culture-specific information, it is not yet known which specific face 
information this relates to. Further work is needed to clarify which face information of so-called 
‘universal’ FACS-coded facial expressions are in fact culture specific and/or diagnostic of 
nationality.  
1.7.2   Decoding of Facial Expression Signals  
Similarly, using the same rationale of culture-specific social priorities, it has been 
proposed that Easterners may use ‘decoding rules’ to interpret facial signals. In this case, 
‘decoding rules’ actively discourage the explicit acknowledgement of negative emotions to avoid 
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social disruption by (Buck, 1984; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989). For example, 
while accurately recognizing the facial expression ‘anger,’ the EA observer may instead choose a 
more socially acceptable emotion (e.g., ‘sad’) when describing the observed facial expression. 
Yet, while acknowledging that culture could influence the decoding of facial expressions via 
culture-specific ‘decoding rules’ as described above, the emotion literature has largely 
overlooked an extensive body of research showing that culture modulates visual perception, 
specifically categorical perception. Here, I will detail some of the main findings that demonstrate 
that culture influences visual perception.  
1.8 Culture and Visual Perception 
How can culture shape visual perception? As originally discussed by Helmholtz 
(Helmholtz, 1867/1925), human visual perception is not a direct translation of the visual 
environment, but created by combining visual information captured by the retina with 
assumptions based on previous experience (i.e., unconscious inference). Visual illusions provide 
some of the best demonstrations of how visual perception reflects the assumptions made about 
the visual environment rather than a direct translation of reality. To illustrate, observe the famous 
Checker-shadow illusion created by Edward H. Adelson (Adelson, 1995) shown below in Figure 
1.3 (see Appendix for original source of image). In the image on the left, labeled ‘Original 
Illusion,’ observe squares ‘A’ and ‘B’ on the chequerboard: they appear to be different shades of 
grey, yet they are in fact exactly the same colour. How has the visual system misinterpreted 
reality? In the image, we can see the green cylinder has cast a shadow on the square ‘B’ on the 
chequerboard, but not on square ‘A.’ Via experiences of the visual environment, the knowledge 
that shadows misrepresent the true underlying colour of an object is acquired. Using this 
knowledge (i.e., unconscious inference), the visual system adjusts perception to obtain a more 
accurate representation of the true underlying colour (i.e., that square ‘B’ is lighter). Indeed, 
perception of square ‘B’ is adjusted towards a lighter shade rather than a darker shade due to 
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inferences made about square ‘B.’ That is, based on the information provided in the image (the 
chequerboard is made from dark and light shades of gray) and previous knowledge of 
chequerboards (squares alternate in colours), the true underlying colour of square ‘B’ is inferred 
to be a light shade of gray5.  
 
Figure 1.3 The Checker-Shadow Illusion – An Example of the Influence of Knowledge on 
Visual Perception. In the image presented on the left labeled ‘Original Illusion,’ observe 
squares ‘A’ and ‘B’ on the chequerboard: they appear to be different shades of grey – ‘A’ is a 
darker shade of gray than ‘B.’ Yet, as shown in the image presented on the right labeled ‘Proof,’ 
squares ‘A’ and ‘B’ are in fact exactly the same colour.  
 
As demonstrated above using the Checker-Shadow illusion, knowledge and experience 
(in this case of shadows and chequerboards) can shape visual perception. Therefore information 
extracted by the visual system can be subject to different interpretations, depending on the 
knowledge and experience acquired (e.g., see Philippe G. Schyns & Rodet, 1997 for effects of 
learning on perception).  
1.8.1 Knowledge, Concepts & Categorization 
                                                 
5 Assumptions are also based on probabilistic reasoning, which are developed from previous experience of the 
environment and knowledge of patterns (conditional probabilities). For example, if we had to guess the colour of the 
last square on the checkerboard, knowledge that the rest of the board appears to be a regular pattern would guide our 
decision – i.e., the last square on the checkerboard is highly likely to be the same colour as two squares previous. 
We do so because the environment is constructed primarily of regular patterns, which thus provides predictive 
information. As a result, agents within the environment are better able to predict the likely events in the environment 
and prepare in advance a response for adaptive action.  
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Essentially, all knowledge and experience are used to create concepts – single complex units of 
information that represent objects6 that can be used to predict the conditions of the environment. 
For example, in the Checker-shadow illusion above, the knowledge that shadows misrepresent 
the true underlying colour of an object forms part of the concept ‘shadow.’ By accessing this 
knowledge, one can predict that items under the shadow will be darkened, resulting in a 
perceptual adjustment. Similarly, additional knowledge about the physical properties of shadows 
(e.g., shadows obstruct light) retained as part of the concept ‘shadow’ predicts that objects 
underneath the shadow may be cooler than objects in direct sunlight. Accurate knowledge of 
whether the objects under the shadow would be lower in temperature than the objects under 
direct sunlight would depend on complex knowledge of the objects in question (e.g., material 
properties such as conductivity). The importance of acquisition of conceptual knowledge is 
clearly demonstrated in developmental studies. For example, Inhelder & Piaget (1958) showed 
that children make mistaken assumptions about the physical properties of objects as they have 
not yet developed a suitably comprehensive understanding of the environment (i.e., conceptual 
knowledge). For example, when asking a child whether a large, heavy block of wood will float 
or sink in water, the child will answer that the object will sink because it’s heavy. Similarly, if 
asked the same question about a small, metal nail, the child will answer that it will float because 
it is light weight (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Of course, the opposite it true due to the operation of 
density (mass) on buoyant forces. Thus, all knowledge of an object is consolidated into a 
concept, which is retained for future use to interpret the environment. Clearly, each culture 
embraces a different conceptual framework of values, beliefs and knowledge (e.g., religion, 
ethical and moral codes, judicial systems, rules for social interaction, and so forth), which exerts 
a generic and powerful top-down influence on the perception and interpretation of the visual 
environment. 
                                                 
6 Here, I refer to an ‘object’ in the philosophical sense. That is, a thing, being or concept that is tangible and 
accessible to human senses.  
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To illustrate, consider the following scenario: a respected member of the community has 
taken a male child and, over the course of several weeks or months, has trained the child to 
willingly accept anal penetration. In Western culture this act would be identified as a case of 
‘grooming’ by a paedophile and that the adult in question should be imprisoned as punishment 
for the psychological and emotional damage inflicted. In contrast, the Kaluli of New Guinea 
would consider this scenario as one of the most important times of the child’s life – a rite of 
passage, which will transform the child into a man by receiving the ‘elixir or life’ (i.e., human 
semen). Without this experience, the child would not develop normally into adulthood and suffer 
ostracism at the hands of the community, with subsequent significant psychological and 
emotional trauma. Indeed, any parent preventing the child from obtaining this experience would 
be perceived as abusive and/or neglectful. As a result, such practices are an integral part of the 
community and constitute a normal part of child development. The adult in question would be 
thanked by the parents, celebrated by the community and recommended to the parents of other 
boys for their services in the future (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) Here, the concept of 
‘good parenting’ (e.g., healthy child development, child protection) is certainly shared between 
both cultural groups, but the informational content of the concept differs wildly: ‘anal 
penetration’ does not feature in (‘normal’) Western concepts of good parenting.  
While this is a particularly striking example (which is by no means an isolated finding in 
terms of polar contrasts of human cognition and behaviour), I have used it to demonstrate the 
immense power of culture on shaping the perception and interpretation of the visual 
environment, specifically categorical perception. For example, Westerners would categorise the 
scenario as ‘child abuse,’ the adult as a ‘pedophile’ and the child a ‘victim.’ In contrast, the 
Kaluli of New Guinea would disagree, categorising the act as ‘child protection,’ the adult as 
39 
 
‘trustworthy and decent’ and the child as ‘proud and happy.’7 Thus, culture (i.e., knowledge and 
concepts) shape how observers categorise objects in the visual environment. Although the above 
example is illustrative, the influence of culture upon categorical and visual perception is 
demonstrated in various empirical studies, of which I will detail the most cogent examples 
below. 
1.8.2 Categorical & Visual Perception  
One of the clearest examples of the influence of culture upon categorical and visual 
perception is a study conducted by Roberson et al., (2000) showing that culture shapes the 
categorization and perception of colour (see also Davidoff, Davies, & Roberson, 1999). In this 
study, English-speaking and Berinmo (of Papua New Guinea) observers were presented with 160 
colour chips from the Munsell colour system (see Figure 1.4 below for an illustration of the 
Munsell system) where each chip represented a fully saturated colour, which varied along 2 
dimensions - hue and lightness (i.e., ‘value,’ see Figure 1.4 below). All colour chips were equally 
spaced along both dimensions. Observers in each cultural group categorised each of the 160 
colour chips according to the lexical terms used to represent different colours in the respective 
cultures (i.e., English speakers used 8 colour categories - ‘red,’ ‘pink,’ ‘orange,’ ‘yellow,’ 
‘green,’ ‘blue,’ ‘purple,’ and ‘brown,’ whereas the Berinmo used 5 colour categories - ‘wapa,’ 
‘mehi,’ ‘wor,’ ‘nol,’ and ‘kel’). By categorising the colour chips, each cultural group could 
therefore represent the concepts of each colour category comprising the wider conceptual 
framework, ‘colour.’  
 
                                                 
7 This example also illustrates that the actions taken to uphold moral and ethical codes of each culture are culture-
specific human constructs and not a reflection of what is intrinsically ‘natural’ or ‘wrong’ or ‘right.’ For example, 
child marriage is not fundamentally ‘wrong,’ as it believed in certain cultures, but reflects the universal desire to 
protect the child from future social ostracism.  
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Figure 1.4 Illustration of the Munsell Colour System  
The Munsell colour system is a colour space that describes colours as varying along three 
dimensions – hue (i.e., similarity to a unique hue – ‘red,’ ‘blue,’ ‘green,’ or ‘yellow’), ‘value’ 
(i.e., lightness) and ‘chroma’ (i.e., saturation). The vertical columnar structure in the center 
represents ‘value,’ which ranges from 0 (black) to 10 (white). The triangular structure represents 
‘chroma,’ which ranges from 0 (low saturation) to 12 (high saturation) and upwards (e.g., 30; not 
represented here), depending on the colour in question. Hue is represented by the circular array 
(positioned at ‘value’ 5, ‘chroma’ 6), which is divided in to 5 basic categories ‘red,’ ‘yellow,’ 
‘green,’ ‘blue,’ and ‘purple’ with 5 overlapping secondary categories (e.g., ‘blue-green’). Each 
exemplar in the Munsell colour system is coded based on the above 3 dimensions, with each 
exemplar equally spaced along each dimension.  
 
Results revealed a striking cultural difference in the categorical perception of colour. For 
example, while the English speakers distinguished between ‘blue’ and ‘green’ colour chips, the 
Berinmo made no such distinction, instead categorising most ‘green’ and ‘blue’ (and some 
‘purple’) chips as one colour – ‘nol.’ Similarly, the Berinmo distinguish between ‘nol’ and ‘wor,’ 
whereas the English speakers make no such distinction, distributing these colours amongst 
various other colour categories (e.g., ‘green,’ ‘blue,’ ‘yellow,’ ‘brown’ and so forth).  
While the above results may appear to be simply an interesting ‘difference of opinion’ 
about colours across cultures, the implications are in fact much greater. Importantly, the authors 
demonstrate that categorical perception exerts a powerful influence upon visual perception itself 
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(see also Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2005). Specifically, that categorical perception 
creates the perceptual illusion that within category items appear more similar than between 
category items, even when the physical difference between exemplars is equal. For example, 
when presented with 3 consecutive (equally spaced) colours (e.g., ‘green1,’ ‘green2’ and 
‘yellow1’) that straddle a culture-relevant categorical colour boundary (i.e., ‘yellow’-‘green’ for 
English speakers) observers perceive the between-category colour (i.e., ‘yellow’) to be the most 
dissimilar of the three. In short, categorical perception distorts visual perception by creating an 
illusion of similarity/dissimilarity. Consequently, the illusion of similarity ‘blinds’ the observer 
to any novel categorical boundary that falls within a single established perceptual category. For 
example, the ‘nol’-‘wor’ colour boundary passes through the colour category ‘green.’ Yet, the 
English speaker perceives all ‘green’ colours as ultimately homogenous, resulting in ‘nol’-‘wor’ 
boundary ‘blindness’ a subsequent poor ‘nol-‘wor’ discrimination performance, even after 
learning. In contrast, when presented with ‘green’ colours, the Berinmo are essentially 
confronted with what appears to be a random selection of colours from different colour 
categories (e.g., ‘nol,’ ‘wor,’ ‘kel’), making the ‘nol’-‘wor’ colour distinction easier than that 
experienced by the English speakers. The flip side is also true when Berinmo observers attempt 
to learn novel colour category boundaries such as the ‘yellow’-‘green’ distinction – here, the 
Berinmo are effectively confronted with a homogenous sample of ‘wor’ colours and are no better 
at discriminating the ‘yellow’-‘green’ boundary than another novel arbitrary colour distinction.  
As demonstrated above, culture exerts a powerful influence upon the human visual 
system: culture-specific knowledge and conceptual frameworks shape categorical perception, 
laying down specific perceptual boundaries on the visual environment. Importantly, these 
boundaries create perceptual illusions that ultimately distort reality, giving rise to culture-
specific perceptual experiences. Such ‘top-down’ cultural influences on the visual system are 
widely demonstrated by relative size judgments (Davidoff, Fonteneau, & Goldstein, 2008), 
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change blindness sensitivities (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006), categorical reasoning styles 
(Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002) and eye movements (Blais, Jack, Scheepers, Fiset, & 
Caldara, 2008; Kelly, Miellet, & Caldara, 2010). However, as mentioned previously, the emotion 
literature has largely overlooked this large body of work when attempting to account for the 
significant cultural differences in the recognition of facial expressions of emotion. As yet, an 
explanation remains elusive.  
1.9 Thesis Rationale  
To obtain a clear understanding of the rationale for this thesis, it is useful to first recap on 
the information provided in the General Introduction. 
1.9.1 Significant Cultural Differences in Facial Expression Recognition Are 
Unexplained 
With biological and evolutionary origins, facial expressions have long been considered 
the ‘universal language of emotion’ with the six facial expressions of emotion – ‘happy,’ 
‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’ recognized at above chance performance across 
diverse cultures (Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, et al., 1969). Yet, some ‘universal’ facial 
expressions elicit significant cultural differences in recognition performance (H. A. Elfenbein & 
N. Ambady, 2002; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Russell, 1994). For example, facial expressions 
such as ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’ consistently elicit lower recognition performance among EA 
compared to WC observers (e.g., Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto 
& Ekman, 1989).  
To account for the reported cultural differences in facial expression recognition, 
discussion and theoretical development generated a number of proposed differences in the 
transmission and decoding of facial expressions. For example, the ‘neuro-cultural’ framework 
proposed that culture-specific display rules could diminish the transmission of certain facial 
expressions, resulting in reduced experience and therefore accuracy of decoding such facial 
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expressions (Ekman, 1972). Similarly, proposed culture-specific ‘accents’ or ‘dialects’ could 
introduce specific variations in the ‘basic’ facial expression signals, making accurate 
interpretation more difficult for out-group compared to in-group observers (H. A. Elfenbein & N. 
Ambady, 2002; Tomkins & McCarter, 1964). In addition, proposed culture-specific ‘decoding 
rules,’ which actively discourages explicit acknowledgement of certain facial expressions, could 
give rise to culturally biased response patterns rather than reflecting a recognition deficit per se.  
Yet, with little empirical investigation, the origins of the reported cultural differences in 
recognition performance remain so far unexplained, as highlighted by Ekman in his book 
‘Emotions Revealed:’ “To this day, I do not know why ‘fear’ and ‘surprise’ [are] not 
distinguished from each other” (Ekman, 1992, pg 10). Thus, an empirical question remains 
unanswered – why do observers from different cultures systematically miscategorise the 
‘universal’ facial expressions of emotion? Indeed, with increasing globalization and cultural 
integration, it is ever more important to understand how culture influences emotion 
communication. In this thesis, I will address this largely neglected and unexplained perceptual 
phenomenon. It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to provide empirical accounts for each and 
every culture that shows a significant deficit in the recognition of the ‘universal’ facial 
expressions. Here, I will focus on WC and EA observer groups, primarily because the 
differences in recognition performance are one of the most widely reported, yet currently 
unexplained (Biehl, et al., 1997; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989). For example, 
while WC observers recognize all 6 ‘universal’ facial expressions with comparably high 
accuracy, EA observers systematically miscategorise ‘fear’ and ‘disgust,’ hereafter referred to as 
the ‘EA recognition deficit.’  
In light of the theoretical accounts and empirical data mentioned above, I will examine 
two key factors in a series of two experiments – cultural decoding of facial expressions and 
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cultural conceptions (i.e., internal representations) of facial expressions. I will briefly detail each 
section below, providing the rationale for the underlying theory and methods used.  
1.9.2 Cultural Decoding of Facial Expressions of Emotion  
To examine cultural differences in the recognition of facial expressions, it is important to 
understand how observers decode facial expression signals. Decoding involves – a) the selection 
of information and b) the transformation of this information into a behavioural response. I will 
address each stage separately in Experiment 1 as detailed below. 
Experiment 1: Eye Movements During Facial Expression Decoding  
Categorization Task: First, I will demonstrate the robustness of the EA recognition deficit by 
replicating the reported behavioural results (i.e., certain ‘universal’ facial expressions elicit 
significantly lower recognition performance amongst EA compared to WC observers) using a 7 
AFC facial expression categorization task. Importantly, I will use the so-called ‘universal’ 
FACS-coded facial expression of emotion (i.e., ‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and 
‘sad,’ plus  ‘neutral’) as they provide standardized facial expression signals. To further 
characterize the nature of the EA recognition deficit, I will examine the EA categorical 
confusions to reveal any consistencies in the categorization errors made. Specifically, I will show 
that EA observers systematically confuse ‘fear’ for ‘surprise’ and ‘disgust’ for ‘anger.’ 
Eye Movements: Eye-movements provide an index of where overt attention is directed over time, 
thereby revealing the strategies of information selection during expression decoding. Therefore, 
to examine the selection of information during facial expression decoding (see point (a) above), I 
will use precision eye tracking technology to record the eye movements of observers while they 
perform the 7AFC categorization task. I will then use novel spatio-temporal analyses of fixations 
to examine the spatial location and temporal order of fixations to reveal the information sampled 
during facial expression decoding and visual strategies used to do so. Specifically, I will show 
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that while WC observers sample the eyes and mouth, EA observers repetitively sample the eye 
region and neglect the mouth, particularly for facial expressions generating confusion. 
Modelling Cultural Information Selection and Facial Expression Categorization: Using 
precision eye tracking technology and novel spatio-temporal fixation analyses to isolate the 
information selected during facial expression decoding. I showed that EA observers 
systematically sample the eye region and neglect the mouth, especially for facial expressions 
giving rise to the reported confusions. As explained in point (b) above, to understand the 
decoding process, it is important to examine the relationship between the sampled information 
and the behavioural responses of observers. Given that I am focusing on the EA recognition 
deficit (i.e., significantly poorer recognition of ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’), I will dedicate this 
experiment to examining the decoding process of EA observers. Specifically, I will examine 
whether the eye information sampled by EA observers gives rise to the categorization confusions 
reported in Experiment 1 (these patterns of confusions are a robust phenomenon also replicated 
elsewhere; e.g., Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Moriguchi, et al., 2005). That is, are the eyes just 
too similar to distinguish certain facial expressions?  
To test this hypothesis, I built a model observer that samples information from the face 
using a sampling method that approximates the human retina to categorise facial expressions. 
Importantly, the model observer represents an objective measure of whether ambiguous eye 
information gives rise to the reported EA confusions, as the model observer considers no other 
(uncontrolled) factors when categorising of facial expressions. In other words, by building a 
model observer, I can isolate and examine the factors relevant to my hypothesis (in this case, 
high similarity of sampled information generates categorization confusions). Using this method, 
I will reveal for the first time that the EA recognition deficit and corresponding categorical 
confusions, is due to a culture-specific fixation pattern that samples ambiguous information.  
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While providing an objective account of the origins of the EA recognition deficit and the 
categorization confusions, the results of Experiment 1 raise additional questions. For example, 
‘universal’ FACS-coded facial expressions of ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’ consistently elicit significantly 
lower recognition performance amongst EA observers compared to WC observers, 
demonstrating that ‘universal’ facial expressions are not representative in EA cultures. How then 
are ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’ accurately represented in EA cultures? Also, why would EA observers 
systematically neglect critical face regions (i.e., the mouth) when decoding facial expressions of 
emotion? After all, the accurate recognition of facial expressions is an essential biological and 
social skill necessary in all cultures, and fixations ought to fall on diagnostic information. 
Therefore, does the diagnostic expressive face information differ across cultures?  
1.9.3  Cultural Conceptions of Facial Expressions of Emotion 
To address the above questions, I will examine how WC and EA observers conceptualize 
(i.e., internally represent) facial expressions of emotion. As mentioned previously, concepts are 
complex units of information corresponding to specific objects in the environment. For example, 
a concept relating to the emotion ‘happy’ will contain information regarding the characteristic 
expressive features of ‘happy’ facial expressions (e.g., wide, smiling mouth with wrinkling of the 
skin at the side of the eyes). Importantly, this information is created from previous experiences, 
which provides predictive information about the world, thus shaping expectations and guiding 
behaviour, including information sampling via eye movements (Blais, et al., 2008; Jack, et al., 
2009; Kelly, et al., 2010). By examining the internal representations (i.e., concepts) of facial 
expressions, I can reveal the facial expression information that WC and EA observers have 
experienced in the past and those expected in the future. 
Experiment 2: Cultural Internal Representations of Facial Expressions of Emotion 
In this experiment, I will estimate and reconstruct the internal representations of the 6 
‘basic’ facial expressions of emotion (i.e., ‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’) 
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in WC and EA observers using a simple yet powerful psychophysical technique – reverse 
correlation (RC).  
Reverse Correlation: As the term ‘correlation’ suggests, RC is well-known psychophysical 
technique that is used to ascertain the relationship between two variables. In this case, I used RC 
to ascertain the relationship between internal representations of facial expressions (i.e., ‘happy,’ 
‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’) and information presented to the observer (i.e., 
expressive face features). To clearly illustrate this technique, I will briefly detail the nature of the 
information presented (i.e., the stimuli) the task, which correlates the two variables in question 
and the procedure to reconstruct the internal representations. 
Stimuli: Since prescribed expressive face features (i.e., FACS-coded facial expressions) provide 
a limited and potentially biased sample of expressive information, I used stimuli that provide 
flexible and unbiased facial expression information. On each trial, a randomly generated white 
noise template is added to a ‘neutral’ expression face, which adds random expressive features by 
changing the pixel values of the face image. For example, the addition of white pixels to the light 
eye region may create the appearance of whiter eyes than the original non-expressive face. As a 
result, the observer may interpret the image as expressive. For example, if the observer perceives 
the stimulus as having very white eyes, the observer may categorise the stimulus as ‘surprise’ if 
the features match those of their internal representation. Thus, the stimuli provide flexible and 
unbiased information as the observer’s response is driven by the influence of top-down (i.e., their 
internal representation) rather than bottom-up information. Furthermore, the presented 
information is not limited to prescribed expressive features. 
Task: By categorising each stimulus according to the 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions of emotion, the 
observer indicates which information corresponds to their internal representation, as described 
above using the very white eyes of ‘surprise.’ Each observer categorised 12,000 stimuli, thus 
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producing a set of white noise templates for each facial expression that contains the information 
corresponding to the observer’s internal representation.  
Reconstruction of Internal Representations: To reveal the information consistently categorised 
(i.e., highly correlated) for each facial expression, the set of white noise templates are summed. 
Finally, the resulting classification image is added to the ‘neutral’ expression face to aid 
visualization of the internal representation.  
Using this technique, I estimated and reconstructed the internal representations of each of 
the 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions for each WC and EA observer, revealing the expressive facial 
features for each internal representation. To conduct cross-cultural comparisons of the expressive 
features for each internal representation, I used statistical image processing techniques, showing 
that facial expression signals differ across cultures. 
 
2. Cultural Decoding of ‘Universal’ Facial Expressions of Emotion 
2.1 Introduction  
Although widely considered to be the ‘universal language of emotion,’ (FACS-coded) 
facial expressions of emotion such as ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’ consistently elicit lower recognition 
levels among EA compared to WC groups (see Elfenbein & N. Ambady, 2002 for a meta-
analysis and ; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Russell, 1994 for reviews). Although the reported EA 
recognition deficit evoked discussion and theoretical developments in the literature (Matsumoto, 
1992; Elfenbein, 2002), an empirical explanation of its origins remains elusive. Here, I will 
address this issue.  
To investigate the origins of the EA recognition deficit, I will focus on the decoding of 
facial expressions of emotion in 2 culturally distinct groups of observers. That is, I will examine 
how the visual systems of culturally distinct observers systematically extract and categorise 
facial expression information. To this aim, I recorded the eye movements of WC and EA 
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observers while they categorised the 6 ‘basic’ ‘universal’ facial expressions of emotion, plus 
‘neutral’ for same-race (SR) and other-race (OR) faces.  
2.2 Methods  
2.2.1 Observers  
Thirteen WC (7 females) and 13 EA (12 Chinese, 1 Japanese, 8 females) observers 
participated (mean age = 24 years 5 months; 23 years 2 months, respectively). All EA 
participants were born in East Asia, arriving in a Western country (United Kingdom; UK) for the 
first time to attend the University of Glasgow. EA participants had been residing in the UK for 1 
week on average at the time of testing. All participants had normal or corrected vision, gave 
written informed consent and paid £6 per hour for their participation. The Departmental Ethical 
Committee approved the experimental protocol. 
2.2.2 Stimuli and Design  
To isolate and examine the effects of decoding during facial expression recognition, I 
controlled for any potential cultural variations in the transmission of facial expression signals by 
using normalized, FACS-coded expressive faces – the so-called ‘universal’ facial expressions. 
Sourced from JACFEE and Japanese and Caucasian ‘neutral’ Faces (JACNeuF) databases 
(Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988), stimuli consisted of 56 images displaying 6 facial expressions 
(‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’) plus ‘neutral.’ Gender and race of face 
were equally distributed in each facial expression category. Using Adobe™ Photoshop CS™, I 
cropped each image to remove any potentially idiosyncratic hairstyles and aligned the eye and 
mouth positions using Psychomoprh software (Tiddeman, Burt, & Perrett, 2001). I displayed the 
images (280 x 380 pixels in size) on a 1024 x 768 pixel white background using a 21” Iiyama 
HM204DTA monitor (refresh rate of 120 Hz) and used SR Research ExperimentBuilder 
software, version 1.4202 to control stimulus presentation. To replicate a natural distance for 
social interaction (Hall, 1966) and represent faces as the average size of a real face (Ibrahimagić-
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Šeper, Čelebić, Petričević, & Selimović, 2006), I set the viewing distance at 60cm. Thus, images 
subtended 10° (horizontally) x 14° (vertically) of visual angle.  
2.2.3 Procedure: Eye Movement Recordings  
To record eye movements, I used an EyeLink II head-mounted eye tracker (SR 
International), which has an average gaze position error of <0.5°, a resolution of 1 arc minute 
and a linear output over the range of the monitor used. I set the sampling rate to 500Hz and used 
the pupil only mode during eye movement recording. I determined ocular dominance using The 
Miles test (Miles, 1930) and tracked only the dominant eye, although observers viewed images 
binocularly. To minimize head movements and maintain a standard viewing distance, I used a 
chin rest. Before testing, I performed a nine-point fixation calibration and validation procedure 
(implemented in the EyeLink API) to establish optimal calibration. A central fixation point 
appeared before each trial, which automatically calculated the drift correction. If drift correction 
exceeded 1° of visual angle, I repeated the calibration and validation procedure until optimal 
criteria were reached.  
2.2.4 Procedure: Categorization of Facial Expressions of Emotion 
I instructed observers to perform a 7 AFC facial expression categorization task with WC 
and EA faces. Prior to testing, I established familiarity with the expressions and their categorical 
labels by providing examples from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (KDEF; 
Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998) and asking observers to provide correct synonyms and 
descriptions of each emotion category. During testing, stimuli appeared pseudo-randomly in one 
of four quadrants of the screen and remained until the participant responded. Observers 
registered their response by giving a manual response using a single button response pad, 
accompanied by a verbal response (to eliminate additional eye movements towards the response 
keys). I recorded responses throughout testing.  
2.2.5 Analysis & Results  
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2.2.5.1 Task Performance: Facial Expression Categorization 
To compare performance accuracy of WC and EA observers in categorising facial 
expressions, I conducted a 3-way (2 Cultures of observers, 2 Race of faces, 7 Facial expressions) 
mixed design ANOVA on mean categorization accuracy. Figure 2.1 summarizes the 
experimental design and presents categorization accuracy with a coloured bar for each condition. 
See also Table 1 for mean accuracies and standard errors for each condition of the experiment.  
 
Figure 2.1 Mean Categorization Accuracies for Each Condition of the Experiment. Panel 
‘WC’: Illustration of the experimental design for Western Caucasian observers categorising 
Same Race (row labeled ‘SR’) and Other Race (row labeled ‘OR’) faces across 7 expressions 
(‘neutral,’ ‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’). One face stimulus exemplar is 
shown per condition. Panel ‘EA’: Illustration of experimental design for East Asian observers for 
the same conditions. The coloured bar to the left of each face represents the mean categorization 
accuracy for that condition where red indicates a significant difference in categorization errors 
between observer groups (P < 0.05). Error bars report standard errors of the mean. 
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A Culture of observer X Facial expression interaction was significant [F(6,144) = 5.608, 
P < 0.001], with post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons showing that EA observers made 
significantly more errors when categorising ‘disgust’ (P < 0.05) and ‘fear’ (P < 0.001) than WC 
observers (presented with a red coloured bar in Figure 2.1). In contrast, WC observers 
categorised all facial expressions with comparably high levels of accuracy. Closer inspection of 
the categorization errors also revealed that ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’ were consistently confused with 
‘surprise’ (78% of errors) and ‘anger’ (72% of errors), respectively. Although consistent with 
previous observations (Ekman, et al., 1987; Matsumoto, 1992; and Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; 
Russell, 1994), a critical question remains unanswered - why do EA observers recognize certain 
facial expressions (i.e. ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’) with significantly lower accuracy compared to WC 
observers? And why do EA consistently confuse ‘fear’ with ‘surprise’ and ‘disgust’ with 
‘anger?’ 
2.2.5.2 Spatio-temporal Fixation Patterns  
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Examination of the location, frequency and temporal order of fixations over the face can 
reveal the information selected to recognize expressions, and the strategy used to do so.  
a) Fixation Location Across Face Features 
To examine the location of fixations across face features, I first computed fixation maps 
for each condition of the experiment by plotting all fixation locations (x, y co-ordinate, from 
correct trials only) across time into a single 280 x 380 matrix. To accurately represent the 
foveated region (2° visual angle) for each fixation location, I smoothed each fixation with a 
Gaussian kernel (α = 10 pixels).  
Next, I established Face regions to provide a common frame of reference for describing 
the location of fixations in terms of face features. I calculated Face regions based on the 
contribution of all significantly fixated regions in each of the 28 conditions. First, I applied the 
Pixel Test (P<.05; Chauvin, Worsley, Schyns, Arguin, & Gosselin, 2005) to fixation maps in 
each condition to reveal the significantly fixated regions. Centroids were calculated for each 
resulting significant region in all conditions. I then pooled all centroids across conditions and 
performed a k-means cluster analysis (MacQueen, 1967) to calculate a single centroid for each 
non-overlapping significantly fixated region. For example, the Pixel Test showed significant 
fixations over the left eye in all twenty-eight conditions, resulting in 28 centroids, which I 
subsequently reduced to a single centroid. Significant fixations over the bridge of the nose 
appearing in the ‘disgust’ and ‘anger’ conditions only were still represented in the final Face 
regions. Therefore, each significantly fixated region appearing in each condition contributed to 
the resulting 5 centroids (corresponding to the Face regions ‘Left eye,’ ‘Right eye,’ ‘Bridge of 
nose,’ ‘Centre of face,’ and ‘Mouth’). 
Figure 2.2 (Panel A) below shows the fixation distributions for each observer group 
collapsed across race of face and expression. Colour-coded distributions represent the density of 
fixations across Face regions, where red indicates the most densely fixated regions. Note that for 
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WC observers (upper fixation map), fixations are more evenly distributed across the face, 
whereas for EA observers (lower fixation map), fixations are biased towards the upper part of the 
face. These culture-specific fixation patterns are consistent across all 7 facial expressions of 
emotion and races of face, as shown in Figure 2.2 (Panel B). Face regions are colour-coded as 
follows: ‘Left eye’ – blue, ‘Right eye’ – green, ‘Bridge of nose’ – yellow, ‘Centre of face’ – 
orange, and ‘Mouth’ – red, with higher colour saturation indicating higher fixation density, 
shown relative to all conditions. Note that the red ‘Mouth’ fixations for EA observers are less 
intense compared to WC observers across all conditions, including ‘happy.’ 
 
Figure 2.2 Fixation Distributions. Panel A: Fixation distributions for each observer group 
collapsed across Race of face and Expression. Colour-coded distributions represent the density 
of fixations across Face regions, with red showing the most densely fixated regions. Note that for 
EA observers (lower fixation map), fixations are biased towards the upper part of the face 
compared to WC observers (upper fixation map), where fixations are more evenly distributed 
across the face. Panel B: Fixation distributions for each condition of the experiment. Colour-
coded distributions presented on gray-scale sample stimuli show the relative distributions of 
fixations across Face regions. Colour-coding is as follows: blue – ‘Left eye,’ green – ‘Right eye,’ 
yellow – ‘Bridge of nose,’ orange – ‘Centre of face,’ red – ‘Mouth.’ Higher colour saturation 
indicates higher fixation density, shown relative to all conditions. Note that the red ‘Mouth’ 
fixations for EA observers are less intense compared to WC observers across all conditions, 
including ‘happy.’ Colour-coded bars represent the mean accuracies for each condition, as in 
Figure 2.1.  
 
To compare the mean number of fixations on Face regions (i.e. ‘Left eye,’ ‘Right eye,’ 
‘Bridge of nose,’ ‘Centre of face’ and ‘Mouth’), I included the fourth factor of Face Region to 
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the original ANOVA design. A significant Culture of observer X Face region interaction [F (4, 
96) = 3.65, P < 0.01) with post-hoc comparisons showed that EA observers made significantly 
more left (P < 0.01) and right eye (P < 0.001) fixations compared to the mouth (Figure 2.2, 
Panel B summarizes this interaction with the corresponding fixation maps), even for ‘happy’ - a 
notable finding given that the mouth is clearly diagnostic for this expression(M. L. Smith, et al., 
2005). In contrast, WC observers fixated all Face regions equally. I found no main effects for 
either Culture of observer or Race of face. 
b) Minimum Description Length  
As shown above in Figure 2.2, WC and EA observers differentially allocate attention to 
the eyes and the mouth. To further characterize biases in information sampling strategies, I 
analyzed the order in which the Face regions were visited using Minimum Description Length 
(MDL) analysis (Jorma, 1989, see Methods). MDL is a statistical method that extracts regular 
patterns from data set sequences (Jorma, 1989; Zhao, Serpedin, & Dougherty, 2006). Here, a 
pattern consists of the succession of fixations landing on Face regions (e.g., ‘Left eye’ - ‘Right 
eye’ - ‘Left eye’). Fixation patterns are represented as a succession of colour-coded circles (e.g., 
blue - green - blue); with each circle representing a Face region (see fixation sequence indicated 
with a black arrow in Figure 2.3). To understand the outcomes of the MDL analysis presented in 
Figure 2.3, consider the sequence of fixations ‘Left eye’ - ‘Right eye’ - ‘Left eye’ in EA 
observers resolving ‘fear’ for OR faces (indicated with a black arrow in Figure 3). This sequence 
is represented with the succession of colour-coded circles (blue - green - blue), each 
corresponding to a Face region. In the same condition, the fixation sequence ‘Right eye’ - ‘Left 
eye’ - ‘Right eye’ is also represented using colour-coded circles (i.e. green - blue - green). All 
fixation sequences shown in Figure 2.3 are represented using colour-coded circles corresponding 
to Face regions.  
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Figure 2.3. Fixation Sequences for Each Condition. Successions of colour-coded circles 
represent the fixation sequences extracted using Minimum Description Length (MDL) analysis 
with each circle representing a Face region. Face regions are colour-coded as in Figure 2.2 
(Panel A). For example, the succession of blue - green - blue circles (indicated with a black 
arrow) corresponds to the fixation sequence ‘Left eye’ - ‘Right eye’ - ‘Left eye.’ Single colour-
coded circles correspond to fixations that do not appear as part of a sequence. Black (and white) 
bars to the right of the fixation sequences represent how frequently the fixation sequence 
appeared in the data set, with black indicating correct trials and white indicating incorrect trials. 
Different levels of gray in each condition represent the order of the fixation sequences. Note the 
higher number of fixations sequences for EA observers compared to WC observers in all 
conditions. Colour-coded bars represent the mean accuracies for each condition, as in Figure 2.1. 
 
I calculated fixation patterns by first categorising fixations on each trial by Face region 
(represented by a number for the purposes of analysis), based on their minimum distance to a 
Face region centroid. For example, a trial with three fixations (e.g., ‘Left eye’ - ‘Mouth’ - ‘Right 
eye’) would be represented as a sequence of three numbers (e.g., 1-5-2). A trial with five 
fixations (e.g., ‘Right eye’ - ‘Left eye’ - ‘Right eye’ - ‘Mouth’ - ‘Left eye’) would be represented 
as a sequence of five numbers (e.g., 2-1-2-5-1). I collapsed redundant fixation sequences 
(fixations occurring consecutively within the same Face region) into a single fixation (e.g., the 
sequence 2-2-1-3 would be re-coded as 2-1-3). Correct and incorrect trials contributed to the data 
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set in each condition and I conducted MDL analysis on each condition separately. I conducted 
MDL analysis from zero (single fixation sequences) through first (two fixation sequences), 
second (three fixation sequences) and up to third order (four fixation sequences) in each 
condition. To eliminate fixation sequences occurring by chance, I used the Monte Carlo 
simulation method to simulate the fixations on each trial. I pseudo-randomly sampled the 
numbers, which corresponded to Face regions (i.e., numbers 1-5) with sampling biased to 
replicate the distribution of observer fixations across Face regions in each condition. I conducted 
10,000 simulations per condition, and computed a frequency distribution for each fixation 
pattern. I then calculated the probability of each fixation pattern occurring, based on the number 
of times it appeared in the observer data set. Fixation patterns occurring significantly frequently 
were included in the results (α = 0.05). 
The results of the MDL analysis revealed a clear cultural contrast – EA observers made 
significantly more specific fixation sequences than WC observers (as shown by a Chi-square test 
of association [χ2(1) = 366.79, P < 0.001; note in Figure 2.3 the high number of colour-coded 
successions of circles for EA observers across conditions]. A significant majority of these 
fixation sequences involved exclusively the left and right eyes [χ2(1) = 395.38, P < 0.001], with 
significantly more used for negative (i.e. ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’) compared to other 
expressions [χ2(1) = 15.97, P < 0.001]. Interestingly, further inspection of categorization errors 
revealed that ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’ were consistently confused with expressions attracting similar 
fixation sequences (i.e., ‘surprise’ and ‘anger’), respectively. Therefore, by persistently biasing 
fixations towards the eyes, it is possible that EA observers extract eye information that is just too 
similar to discriminate certain expressions. 
At this juncture, it is important to now specifically examine the contribution of 
information sampling via eye movements to the reported EA behavioural deficit.  
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2.2.6. Procedure: Modelling Cultural Information Selection and Facial 
Expression Categorization 
Behavioural and eye movement data show that EA observers consistently miscategorise 
facial expressions such as ‘fear’ and ‘disgust,’ which is associated with a culture-specific 
fixation pattern that samples information from the eyes while neglecting diagnostic information. 
Could the EA recognition deficit be due to an inadequate culture-specific decoding strategy that 
selects ambiguous information? To objectively determine whether sampling the eyes while 
neglecting more diagnostic face regions (e.g., the mouth for happy) could give rise to the 
reported EA behavioural confusions, I built a model observer that samples face information to 
categorise facial expressions. 
2.2.6.1 Methods  
    2.2.6.1.1 The Model Observer 
To objectively examine the contribution of culture specific information sampling to the 
reported EA behavioural confusions, I built a model observer which generated estimated patterns 
of confusions based on samples of face information (see Figure 2.4, Panel A for an illustration of 
the procedure). 
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Figure 2.4 The Model Observer: Illustration of the Procedure to Compute Estimated 
Patterns of Confusion. Panel A: Information samples. To compute estimated patterns of 
confusion, the model sampled face information from the stimulus expression (e.g., ‘fear’) and 
from the same location on the other expressions (e.g., ‘surprise,’ ‘anger,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘sad,’ and  
‘neutral’). The face images illustrate an example of the information sampled. Panel B: Confusion 
patterns. The model then Pearson correlated the stimulus expression sample with each of the 
other expression samples. These correlations (plotted in dashed colour-coded lines beneath each 
corresponding face) represented the confusions of the model and were fitted (in a least means 
squared sense) against the behavioural confusions of the EA observers (plotted in black). The 
behavioural confusions of the EA observers were obtained by categorising each incorrect trial by 
response, for each expression (e.g., for ‘fear’ trials, the number of incorrect responses were 
computed for ‘neutral,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’). I repeated the sampling and 
correlation process for 10,000 individual samples selected randomly across the face and finally 
sorted each information sample according to its fit to the behavioural confusions of the EA 
observers (‘best’ to ‘worst’ fits are shown in Figure 5, Panel A). I followed the same procedure 
for each expression.  
 
a) Retinal Filter  
The model observer obtained samples of face information using a method, which 
approximates the information extracted by the visual system during a fixation. To achieve this, I 
built a retinal filter which operated as follows: First, the image was linearly decomposed using 
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Fourier transform into a 4 level Laplacian pyramid (Simoncelli & Freeman, 1995), where each 
level contains distinct and non-overlapping spatial frequency information extracted from the 
original stimulus. Each level was then filtered by applying a Gaussian window (α = 10 pixels, to 
represent the fovea – 2° of visual angle) to the same relative image location, as specified by 
random co-ordinates (x, y) generated in each trial. After filtering, the 4 levels were recombined 
using Fourier transform to produce the desired image (see Figure 2.4, Panel A). Thus, the 
resulting image shows high spatial resolution information at the centre of the ‘fixation’ (i.e., the 
fovea) with increasingly lower spatial lower resolution information radiating outwards towards 
the periphery to emulate information extracted by the parafoveal regions.  
b) Estimating Patterns of Confusion  
To estimate a pattern of confusions (i.e. similarity) based on a sample of information, the 
model observer Pearson correlated the sampled information of the stimulus expression (e.g., 
‘fear’ in Figure 2.4, Panel A) with information sampled from the same location of each of the 
other expressive faces (e.g., ‘surprise,’ ‘anger,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘sad,’ and ‘neutral’ in Figure 2.4, Panel 
A). The correlation values (plotted in dashed colour-coded lines in Figure 2.4, Panel B) 
represented the confusions of the model observer.  
To illustrate, consider the facial information sampled by the model observer in Figure 
2.4, Panel A. When sampling the eye region of ‘fear,’ the information is most similar (i.e. 
confusable) to that of ‘surprise’ and much less so for the other expressions (see red box). Thus, 
sampling from the eye region gives rise to a pattern of confusions (i.e. Pearson correlation 
values), represented by the red curve in Panel B. In contrast, sampling from the mouth region 
(see green box) produces a different pattern of confusions (green curve in Panel B) whereby 
‘fear’ and ‘surprise’ are now distinguishable. Thus, each sample (i.e., ‘fixation’) is associated 
with a specific pattern of confusions.  
c)  Replication of East Asian Behavioural Performance  
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The model observer then fitted (using ordinary least square) each confusion pattern 
(plotted in dashed colour-coded lines in Figure 2.4, Panel B) to the behavioural confusion pattern 
of the EA observers (data extracted from Experiment 1, plotted in black in Figure 2.4, Panel B). 
For example, sampling the eye region (red box) produces a pattern of confusions (red curve) that 
more closely fits those of the EA observers, relative to samples from the mouth (green curve). 
The behavioural confusions of the EA observers were obtained by categorising each incorrect 
trial (extracted from Experiment 1) by response for each expression (e.g., for ‘fear’ trials, the 
number of incorrect responses were computed for ‘neutral,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and 
‘sad’).  
2.2.6.1.2 Stimuli  
Stimuli consisted of 6 gray-scale face images, each displaying one of 6 facial expressions 
of emotion (‘neutral,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad.’ ‘Happy’ was not included as 
it was seldom confused with any other expression). I computed each facial expression image by 
averaging across 8 identities (half female, half EA) sourced from the JACFEE and JACNeuF 
databases (Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988) each of which were coded according to FACS. Prior to 
averaging, I aligned each face on the eye and mouth positions using Psychomorph software 
(Tiddeman, et al., 2001) and cropped the final image around the face using Adobe Photoshop 
CS® to remove hair.  
2.2.6.1.3. Simulation of Information Extraction for Facial expression 
Categorization  
For each facial expression (i.e., ‘neutral,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’), 
the model observer randomly sampled 10,000 individual samples from the face and calculated a 
pattern of confusions for each sample – i.e. for each pixel of the face serving as center of 
fixation. Finally, the model observer computed an ordinary least square fit of each pattern of 
62 
 
confusion to the EA behavioural pattern of confusion. The model observer conducted the same 
procedure on each facial expression separately.  
2.2.6.2 Analysis: Isolating information selected during facial expression 
confusions  
To reveal the face information, which most closely reproduced the behavioural 
confusions of the EA observers, I sorted each information sample according to its fit to the 
behavioural confusions of the EA observers. I followed the same procedure for each of the 6 
facial expressions. Figure 2.5, Panel A shows the rank order of all information samples 
according to their fit to the EA observer behavioural confusions, from best (red, R2 = 3.3) to 
worst (blue, R2 = 4.6) R2 values, for each facial expression.  
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Figure 2.5 Comparison of Model Observer and EA Observers. Panel A: Rank order of 
samples extracted by the model observer. For each expression, all samples were ranked 
according to fit (R2) of model pattern of confusions to the EA observer behavioural pattern of 
confusions. Rank order is indicated by colour-coded lines, with red showing the ‘best fit’ (R2 = 
3.3). For example, consider the results for ‘fear’ – by sampling the eye brow (delimited in red) 
and eye region (delimited in orange) the model produced a pattern of confusions most similar to 
that of the EA observers. In contrast, the lower part of the face (delimited in blue and green) 
produced a pattern of confusions most dissimilar (R2 = 4.6) to that of the EA observers. Panel B: 
EA observer fixation maps. For each expression, fixations leading to behavioural confusion 
errors are shown by relative distributions presented on gray-scale sample stimuli. Red areas 
indicate higher fixation density for each expression. Note the higher density of fixations in the 
upper part of the face for each expression. Panel C: Model observer and EA observer fixation 
maps. Note the higher density of EA observer fixations (represented by red areas) within the face 
regions ranked as ‘best fit’ (areas delimited in red and orange). By mirroring the behavioural 
confusions of the EA observers, the model observer produced a sampling bias towards the eyes 
and eye brows. This demonstrates that the behavioural confusions of the EA observers are 
symptomatic of an information sampling strategy that selects ambiguous information (i.e. the 
eyes and eyebrows) while neglecting more diagnostic features (i.e. the mouth). 
 
2.2.6.3 Results  
2.2.6.3.1 Information Selection - Model Observer vs. East Asian 
Observers  
As shown, the model observer most closely replicated the EA observer pattern of 
confusions when sampling the eye (delimited in orange) and eyebrow (delimited in red) regions. 
Sampling from the lower part of the face (i.e. the mouth, delimited in light blue) produced the 
most dissimilar pattern of confusions. Panel B shows the fixation maps of EA observers during 
incorrect trials (data extracted from Experiment 1). I computed the fixation maps for each facial 
expression show in Figure 2.5, Panel B in the same way as in Experiment 1 using only fixations 
from EA observer incorrect trials and collapsing across Race of face. Panel C shows the EA 
fixation maps aligned with the model predictions, confirming that the face regions fixated most 
are those predicted by the model. This demonstrates that the reported behavioural confusions of 
the EA observers are symptomatic of an information sampling strategy that selects ambiguous 
information (i.e. the eyes and eyebrows) and neglects more diagnostic features (i.e. the mouth). 
2.3 Discussion  
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 Here, I report a marked cultural difference in the categorization of facial expressions – 
EA observers categorised ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’ with significantly lower accuracy compared to 
their WC counterparts. Interestingly, EA observers systematically miscategorised ‘fear’ as 
‘surprise’ and ‘disgust’ as ‘anger,’ as supported by the literature (e.g., Ekman, et al., 1987, pp 
714). Eye movements also revealed a cultural contrast in how information is sampled from the 
face to decode facial expressions. While WC observers distributed their fixations evenly, EA 
observers biased theirs towards the upper part of the face, including the eyes. As shown by 
analysis of fixation sequences, EA observers systematically and repetitively sampled these 
regions when confronted with negative expression stimuli (e.g., ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and 
‘sad’) including those giving rise to significant behavioural confusions (i.e., ‘fear’ and 
‘disgust’)8. 
 To objectively examine whether culture specific fixation patterns of EA observers could 
give rise to the reported behavioural confusions, I built a model observer. By ‘fixating’ different 
regions of the face, the model observer generated patterns of confusions based on the 
information sampled from the face. Examination of the patterns of confusions showed that the 
model observer replicated the reported behavioural confusions of the EA observers by mirroring 
their culture-specific fixation pattern (i.e., biasing fixations towards the eyes). In contrast, the 
model observer produced patterns of confusion most dissimilar to those of the EA observers by 
sampling information from the mouth – a region systematically neglected by EA observers. 
Using a model observer, I objectively demonstrate that by biasing fixations towards the eyes, EA 
observers sample information that makes certain facial expressions virtually indistinguishable 
(i.e., ‘fear’ from ‘surprise’ and ‘disgust’ from ‘anger’), thus giving rise to a specific pattern of 
behavioural confusions.  
                                                 
8 It is beyond the scope of the above experiment to reveal the time course of categorization of the facial expression 
stimuli (i.e., whether categorization occurred prior to eye movements or not). 
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Here, I focused on the decoding of facial expressions to investigate cultural differences in 
the recognition of facial expressions. To interpret my results, let us first consider what decoding 
involves – a) the selection of information and b) the transformation of this information into a 
behavioural response. Our data clearly show that WC and EA observers differ on both accounts. 
However, in order to explain the EA behavioural deficit, we must understand the nature of the 
transformation.  
EA observers persisted in fixating the eye region of facial expressions associated with 
behavioural confusions, despite the apparent lack of diagnostic information (P.G. Schyns, Petro, 
& Smith, 2007; M. L. Smith, et al., 2005). Yet, when confronted with potentially ambiguous 
(i.e., non-diagnostic) information, EA observers nevertheless showed a bias in their behavioural 
response, tending to categorise the stimulus as the less socially threatening of the two – 
‘surprise.’ This suggests that the categorization of facial expressions may be influenced by a 
conjunction of information sampling via eye movements and cultural motivations to discourage 
the recognition of negative expressions. However, contrary to current hypotheses regarding 
‘decoding rules,’ my results do not support the notion that negative facial expressions are 
initially recognized accurately before being substituted by a more socially acceptable emotion 
(Buck, 1984; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989 and) or judged as less intense 
(Ekman, et al., 1987; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989). My eye movement data refute this: EA 
observers biased their fixations away from diagnostic information. Indeed, this is puzzling in 
itself – why would Easterners use a fixation pattern that neglects diagnostic information? After 
all, the accurate recognition of facial expressions is a biological skill necessary for human social 
interaction, and fixation patterns should centre on diagnostic information, in any culture. 
 Cultural differences in fixation patterns may reflect cultural specificity in the 
transmission of facial expression signals. This could shape EA observers to fixate subtle 
emotional cues around the eyes (Yuki, Maddux, & Masuda, 2007). Indeed, Panel B of Figure 2.2 
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also reveals that EA observers fixated more towards the eyebrows. Though anecdotal, this 
pattern is similar to Eastern emoticons where (^.^) is used for ‘happy’, (;_;) for ‘sad’ and (O.O) 
for ‘surprise’ (Pollack, 1996). Direct foveation of the eye region implies extraction of fine-
grained information extraction, in contrast to the coarse-grained, global information implied by 
the majority of central fixations in EA observer face identification (Blais, et al., 2008). It must be 
stressed that FACS-coding is an agreed norm for WC expressions of emotion, and WC observers 
did indeed categorise each expression accurately. Therefore, when interacting with Westerners, 
Easterners will tend to be confronted with FACS-coded expressions rather than those displayed 
in their own culture, potentially leading to cultural misunderstandings.  
 Finally, I clearly show that EA observers do not avoid eye gaze during facial 
expression decoding, questioning the role of gaze avoidance in face processing among EA 
observers. For example, recent research showed that EA observers avoided the eye region in 
favour of a central fixation strategy for face identification (compared to WC observers who 
distributed fixations across the eyes and mouth (Blais, et al., 2008). My data suggest that culture-
specific fixation patterns used by WC and EA observers for face processing (i.e., identification 
and emotion recognition) are not influenced by gaze avoidance, but rather reflect strategies 
developed to achieve diagnostic recognition. My data, together with recent research (Blais, et al., 
2008), demonstrate genuine perceptual differences between EA and WC observers, showing that 
face processing is not universal across tasks. The extent to which human visual perception is 
shaped by cultural ideologies (e.g., individualism in Western culture and collectivism in Eastern 
culture) to produce different processing strategies (e.g., analytical amongst Westerners compared 
to a global processing style amongst Easterners) remains an interesting consideration open to 
further scientific scrutiny (see Han & Northoff, 2008 for an overview).  
2.4 Conclusions  
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 In sum, my behavioural and eye movement data provide new insights into cultural 
differences in the decoding of facial expressions of emotion. While WC observers distribute 
fixations evenly across the face, EA observers systematically miss critical aspects of FACS-
coded faces (e.g., Action Units 20, 26 and 27) that are important for recognizing expressions 
such as ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’ (M. L. Smith, et al., 2005).  
In the above validation study using a model observer, I showed that by sampling 
information from the eyes, the model observer is unable to distinguish certain facial expressions, 
leading to a pattern of confusions most similar to that of EA observers. Therefore, my data show 
that the EA behavioural deficit is due to a culture-specific fixation strategy that selects 
ambiguous information (i.e., persistent sampling of the eye region while neglecting more 
diagnostic regions such as the mouth). 
 Importantly, these results have implications for future studies using brain imaging 
technology. Culture-specific biases in visual information sampling strategies are likely to 
correspond to modulated neural signals, therefore constituting a potential source of variance in 
measured brain activity. With a recent surge of costly brain imaging research, my data therefore 
makes a timely contribution to practical aspects of new research methods, including 
electroencephalography (EEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
magnetoencephalography (MEG). 
 
3. Internal Representations of Facial Expressions of Emotion  
3.1 Introduction  
Although FACS-coded facial expressions represent ‘universal’ signals of emotion, 
significant cultural difference in recognition performance are reported throughout the literature 
(Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, et al., 1969; Matsumoto, 1992; 
Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989). Specifically, while WC observers recognize all 6 ‘basic’ facial 
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expressions with comparable accuracy, EA observers consistently miscategorise ‘fear’ and 
‘disgust.’ In addition, WC and EA observers sample different information during facial 
expression recognition via culture-specific fixation patterns – WC observers fixate the eyes and 
the mouth, whereas EA observers bias fixations towards the eyes and away from diagnostic 
information (i.e. the mouth). Robust cultural differences in recognition performance, coupled 
with culture-specific decoding strategies question whether ‘universal’ FACS-coded facial 
expressions accurately represent human emotion in all cultures.  
With such a broad impact of culture upon social behaviour and visual experience, 
observers from different cultures are likely to have developed markedly different internal 
representations of facial expressions of emotion, reflecting both past experience and future 
expectations. However, with no objective method available to accurately access the mind of 
individual observers, obtaining direct and detailed evidence of culture-specific internal 
representations of facial expressions has remained challenging and elusive. Here, I will address 
this issue using a powerful reverse correlation (RC) technique to access the “mind’s eye” of two 
culturally distinct observer groups (see alsoAhumada & Lovell, 1971; Gosselin & Schyns, 2003; 
Kontsevich & Tyler, 2004 for examples of the application of the RC technique). For each 
individual observer, I estimated, reconstructed and analyzed their internal representation of each 
of the six ‘basic’ expressions of emotion: ‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad.’ 
3.2 Methods  
3.2.1 Observers  
Two cultural groups of observers participated – WC and EA. The WC group consisted of 
15 observers (14 European, 1 North American, mean age 27.3 years (s.d. 6.4 years) 8 males), and 
the EA group consisted of 15 observers (15 Chinese, mean age 23.5 years (s.d. 2.1 years) 5 
males). All EA observers were born in East Asia, having arrived in a Western country (UK) for 
the first time, with an average residence of 1.8 months (s.d. 2.1 months) duration and a minimum 
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International English Language Testing System score of 6.0 at the time of testing. All subjects 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, gave written informed consent, and paid £6 per hour 
for participating. The University of Glasgow Department of Psychology ethical committee 
approved the experimental protocol. 
3.2.2 Stimuli 
Each experimental stimulus consisted of the same background stimulus (a gray-scale, 
racially ambiguous ‘neutral’ expression face, with gray-levels scaled to between 100 and 130, on 
an 8-bit scale ranging from 0 to 255) superimposed with a different pattern of uniform white 
noise (in the gray-level range of -50 to +50) – see Figure 3.1, Panel A for an illustration. I 
computed the background ‘neutral’ expression face by averaging across 8 identities (half female, 
half EA, (Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988), previously cross-culturally verified as ‘neutral’ (e.g., 
Biehl, et al., 1997; P. Ekman, et al., 1987; Paul Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Jack, et al., 
2009; D. Matsumoto, 1992; David Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Moriguchi, et al., 2005). Prior to 
averaging, I aligned each ‘neutral’ face on the eye and mouth positions using Psychomorph 
software (Tiddeman, et al., 2001) and cropped the final image around the face using Adobe 
Photoshop CS®.  
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Figure 3.1 Illustration of the Reverse Correlation (RC) Technique. (A) Stimulus generation 
and procedure. On each trial, I added white noise a ‘neutral’ face, thereby adding random 
features. Naïve observers categorised 12,000 such stimuli according to 6 facial expressions of 
emotion, thus producing a set of white noise templates per emotion category. (B) Reconstruction 
of estimated internal representations. For each observer (e.g., WC observers ‘VR,’ and ‘AG,’ and 
EA observers ‘XZ’ and ‘SW’), I summed the set of white noise templates in each emotion 
category to reveal the features used consistently for categorization. I then added the resulting 
features to the ‘neutral’ face to aid visualization of the internal representation. (C) Each face 
shows the internal representation of a facial expression of emotion estimated using RC. Each 
internal representation is selected from a different observer (i.e., ‘PC,’ ‘XZ,’ ‘SM,’ ‘RSM,’ 
‘AG,’ and ‘XZ’) across WC and EA groups. 
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3.2.3 Design and Procedure 
On each trial of the Experiment, adding white noise to the racially and emotionally 
‘neutral’ expression face added random features. Observers will tend to interpret the resulting 
image as expressive if the added features correspond to those in their internal representation. For 
example, if the observer perceives wide opened eyes in the presented image, and their internal 
representation of ‘surprise’ contains this feature, the observer will interpret the image as 
‘surprise’ (see Figure 3.1, Panel A). 
I instructed observers to perform a 7AFC facial expression categorization task according 
to the 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions of emotion (i.e., ‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ 
and ‘sad’), plus a ‘don’t know’ response. Observers each categorised 12,000 such trials 
according to the 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions of emotion, thus producing a set of white noise 
templates associated with each subjective categorical judgment (see Figure 3.1, Panel B for 
colour-coded examples, with red for ‘surprise’ and green for ‘anger’). Observers viewed stimuli 
(380 x 280 pixels) on a mid-gray background displayed on a 19-inch Flat Panel monitor. A chin 
rest ensured a constant viewing distance of 85cm with images subtending 4.9° (horizontally) x 
6.8° (vertically) of visual angle. Each stimulus remained visible until the observer responded 
using a keyboard. Prior to the Experiment, I established observer familiarity with the emotion 
categories by asking observers to provide correct synonyms and descriptions of each emotion 
category. All observers remained naïve as to the ‘neutral’ nature of the underlying background 
face throughout testing. 
3.2.4 Computation: Estimating Internal Representations of Facial Expressions. 
For each observer, to estimate the internal representation of each of the 6 ‘basic’ facial 
expressions, I first summed the set of white noise templates in the relevant category (e.g., 
‘surprise’ outlined in red) before smoothing with a Gaussian kernel (σ = 3 pixels) – see Figure 
3.1, Panel B for an illustration. This summed white noise represents the changes in gray-level 
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pixel values that, added to the ‘neutral’ face, lead the observer to perceive one of the emotions. 
After Z-scoring, I applied a statistical threshold (P <.05; Chauvin, et al., 2005) to isolate the 
significant pixels for further analysis (not shown in Figure 3.1, panel B). To visualize internal 
representations, I added the unthresholded summed set of white noise templates to the ‘neutral’ 
face. As a result, each internal representation contains the features the observer expects to 
constitute a particular facial expression. For example, as shown in Figure 3.1, Panel B, the 
internal representation of ‘surprise’ for WC observer ‘VR’ contains features from the raised 
rounded eyebrows, wide-opened eyes and the rounded mouth whereas for EA observer ‘XZ’ the 
internal representation comprises only the wide-opened eyes. To represent each cultural group, I 
computed average internal representations for each emotion category. Figure 3.2 below shows 
the average cultural internal representations for each of the 6 facial expression categories, 
calculated by averaging the noise template across all observers in each cultural group.  
 
Figure 3.2. Average Cultural Internal Representations. Each row of faces shows the average 
internal representations of each cultural group (i.e., ‘WC’ and ‘EA’), calculated by averaging the 
noise templates across all observers. Each facial expression category (i.e., ‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ 
‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger,’ and ‘sad’) is depicted separately.  
3.2.5 Computation: Statistics over Facial Features.  
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To describe the location of significant information in the internal representations of the 
cultural groups, I first established 5 face regions of interest (corresponding to ‘left eyebrow,’ 
‘right eyebrow,’ ‘left eye,’ ‘right eye’ and ‘mouth’) since most statistically significant pixels 
were represented in these regions (78.4% and 70.8% of statistically significant pixels for WC 
and EA observers, respectively). To analyze cultural differences, I compared the number of WC 
and EA observers representing features in each of the face regions of interest – specifically, ‘left 
eyebrow,’ ‘right eyebrow,’ ‘left eye,’ ‘right eye’ and ‘mouth.’ After isolating the significant 
pixels for each observer and facial expression independently, I summed the templates across all 
15 observers in each cultural group and established a threshold number of significant pixels (∂ 
>= 10) per face region. Then, I conducted Chi-squared tests of association across the resulting 
WC and EA group templates, which revealed consistent culture-specific biases across all 6 facial 
expressions (p <.05). Figure 3.3 illustrates the results for each facial expression using colour-
coded regions to indicate cultural bias strength (red indicates a strong WC bias; blue indicates a 
strong EA bias, with the maximum bias as 15 observers in one group reconstructing a face 
feature vs. 0 observers in the other cultural group).  
 
Figure 3.3 Cultural Biases in Features. In each row (WC and EA), colour-coded areas (red 
corresponding to WC observers and blue corresponding to EA observers) presented on gray-
scale ‘neutral’ faces show the cultural biases (P<.05) in the reconstruction of features for each 
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facial expression of emotion. Magnitude of bias (i.e., absolute difference in the number of 
observers) is represented by colour-coded bar to the right. For example, consider ‘surprise:’ 
while 7 more WC than EA internal representations contained the eyebrows and mouth (indicated 
by red areas on ‘neutral’ face), 8 more EA than WC internal representations contained the eyes 
(indicated by blue areas on ‘neutral’ face).  
 
3.3 Results  
  3.3.1 Cross-cultural comparisons 
As shown in Figure 3.3 (top row), WC internal representations contained the eyebrows 
and the mouth significantly more than in EA representations. In contrast, EA representations 
(Figure 3.3, bottom row) largely contained the eyes, while neglecting other features compared 
with WC observers. Such differences contradict the universality hypothesis, which would predict 
reconstruction of similar features across WC and EA groups, instead supporting theories of 
cultural differences in facial expression signals. 
Further inspection of the data revealed another intriguing cultural difference – gaze 
avoidance, shown only in the EA group. Five EA observers reconstructed gaze avoidance in at 
least one facial expression each (see Figure 3.4 for examples of individual EA observer data), 
whereas no WC observers showed any gaze avoidance. Although not pervasive across the group, 
gaze avoidance nevertheless emerged as a unique feature amongst EA observers, as predicted by 
literature (e.g., Knapp & Hall, 2005), and therefore validating my methods to reveal cultural 
differences. 
 
Figure 3.4 Gaze Avoidance in East Asian Internal Representations of Facial Expressions of 
Emotion. Each face demonstrates the use of gaze avoidance to communicate emotion. Each 
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example is selected from a different East Asian observers (i.e., ‘FW,’ ‘SW,’ ‘XZ,’ ‘QZ’ and 
‘JT’) pertaining to the following emotions: ‘disgust,’ ‘anger,’ ‘fear,’ ‘surprise,’ and ‘surprise,’ 
respectively. No Western Caucasian observers showed any gaze avoidance in their internal 
representations.  
3.4 Discussion  
Using templates of white noise, I randomly added features to a racially and emotionally 
‘neutral’ face, and instructed observers from two culturally distinct groups to categorise each 
image by facial expression. I then reconstructed the internal representations of each facial 
expression in both cultural groups of observers, using statistical image processing techniques to 
examine the properties of each internal representation. I revealed clear cultural differences in the 
internal representations of 6 facial expressions of emotion. Specifically, while WC 
representations distributed expressive features across the face (e.g., the eyebrows and mouth), 
EA representations showed a consistent bias in reconstructing information from the eyes. Further 
inspection of the EA bias also revealed a unique feature in the EA group - gaze avoidance.  
To interpret my results, it is important to first consider what an internal representation 
represents. Created from experiences with the environment, internal representations provide 
predictive information about the world, shaping expectations and guiding behaviour, including 
information sampling via eye movements (Blais, et al., 2008; Jack, et al., 2009; Kelly, et al., 
2010). Therefore, by estimating the internal representations of facial expressions of emotion in 
two culturally distinct groups, I captured culture-specific information that reflects both past 
experience and future expectations of facial expression signals. My data show that WC and EA 
observers expect emotion to be expressed using distinct facial expression signals, thus supporting 
views of cultural specificity in facial expressions. 
Cultural specificity in the facial expression signals shown here may reflect contrasts in 
the experience of and exposure to facial expression signals across cultures, demonstrating 
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cultural diversification of signals used for emotion communication. Rather, ecologically valid 
representations of facial expression signals would include expressive features characteristic of 
the culture. For example, I show that observers within the EA group expect gaze avoidance to be 
a component of facial expression signals, which currently does not feature in facial expression 
stimuli widely used in research. Furthermore, while modulations in gaze play a social role in 
revealing source of attention (see Kingstone, 2009; Klein, Shepherd, & Platt, 2009 for reviews), 
my data show that gaze direction plays a wider role in social interaction by providing 
information relating to internal emotional states.  
Culture-specific expectations of facial expression signals also likely contribute to the 
reported consistent cultural differences in the recognition of ‘universal’ facial expressions (e.g., 
Biehl, et al., 1997; P. Ekman, et al., 1987; Paul Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Jack, et al., 
2009; D. Matsumoto, 1992; David Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Moriguchi, et al., 2005), as 
information conflicting (or mismatching) with internal representations would generate confusion. 
Moreover, the locations of expected expressive features reported here are consistent with culture-
specific fixation patterns used during facial expression decoding (Jack, et al., 2009; see also 
Yuki, et al., 2007), highlighting the role of top-down factors on biological visual systems in the 
selection of diagnostic information. Thus, culture-specific fixation patterns that sub-sample 
culturally incongruent facial expressions would further hinder the decoding process, resulting in 
confusion.  
At this juncture, it is worth noting that although eye movements were not recorded during 
the RC experiment, the bias in feature reconstruction by the EA is unlikely to be an artifact of a 
culture-specific bias in fixation strategy (as shown in Experiment 1). First, the visual system 
does not rely solely on the information subtending the centre of each fixation (i.e., 2° of visual 
angle; the fovea) to resolve perceptual tasks. Rather, at each fixation, the retina is stimulated by 
information subtending the entire visual field (i.e., foveal, parafoveal, peripheral). Thus, 
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fixations do not bias information extraction to the fovea (or to any other visual field). For 
example, Blais et al., (Blais, et al., 2008) showed that EA observers identify faces by fixating an 
information-poor region of the face (i.e., the nose), demonstrating a dissociation between 
fixation location and information extraction (see also Roberto Caldara, Zhou, & Miellet, 2010). 
Secondly, while fixations can show the information extracted by the retina, they cannot reveal 
the information that is actually used by the observer to resolve the task. For example, consider 
that each fixation landing on the face extracts information from all features (e.g., eyes, nose 
mouth) by virtue of the wide visual field. Yet, to resolve the task of emotion categorization, 
observers use only specific samples of the information extracted by each fixation (M. L. Smith, 
et al., 2005). Given that fixations a) lack specificity in the information used to resolve perceptual 
tasks and b) do not correspond with the location of diagnostic features, their ability to bias 
information use is limited and unlikely to create artifacts in data collection used with RC. 
3.5 Conclusions  
For the first time, I estimated and reconstructed the internal representations of the 6 
‘basic’ facial expressions of emotion in two culturally distinct groups of observers. Using 
statistical image processing techniques to examine the signal properties of the internal 
representations, I revealed significant differences in the expressive features used between the 
cultural groups – while WC internal representations contained significantly more eyebrow and 
mouth features, EA internal representations primarily featured the eyes. For the first time, my 
data directly show cultural specificity in the representation of facial expressions signals, 
challenging notions of a ‘universal language of emotion.’  
 
4. General Conclusions  
 In this thesis, I focused on investigating the origins of a well-documented but largely 
neglected and so far unexplained psychological phenomenon – the EA recognition deficit for 
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certain ‘universal’ facial expressions. To account for the systematic differences in recognition 
performance between WC and EA observers when decoding ‘universal’ facial expressions of 
emotion, I examined two important sources of cultural variation over the course of two 
experiments – cultural decoding and representation of facial expression signals. I will briefly 
return to the main results of each experiment before discussing the wider implications.  
Experiment 1: Cultural Decoding of ‘Universal’ Facial Expressions of Emotion  
Task Performance: Here, I replicated the EA recognition deficit, demonstrating the robustness of 
the phenomenon - while WC observers recognize all 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions with 
comparably high accuracy (i.e., >85%), EA observers consistently miscategorised ‘fear’ and 
‘disgust.’ Closer inspection of the data also revealed a systematic pattern of confusions – EA 
observers consistently miscategorised ‘fear’ as ‘surprise’ and ‘disgust’ as ‘anger.’ Importantly, 
such confusions are likely to have significant repercussions for cross-cultural communication as 
the mutual understanding of emotions is central to all human social interaction.  
Eye Movements: Spatio-temporal analyses of eye movement data revealed a clear cultural 
contrast in the fixation patterns over face features used during the categorization of the 6 
‘universal’ facial expressions (plus neutral). Specifically, while WC observers distributed 
fixations evenly across the face (i.e., the eyes and the mouth), EA observers persistently biased 
fixations towards the eyes while neglecting the mouth, particularly for facial expressions giving 
rise to significant confusions (i.e., ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ and ‘anger’).  
Modelling Cultural Information Selection and Facial Expression Categorization 
To objectively determine whether the culture specific EA fixation pattern gives rise to the 
reported confusions, I built a model observer that samples information from the face to 
categorise facial expressions. Using this technique, I showed that the model observer replicated 
the EA confusions by mirroring the EA fixation pattern. For the first time, I revealed that the EA 
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recognition deficit is due to a culture-specific fixation pattern that selects ambiguous 
information.  
Experiment 2: Cultural Internal Representations of Facial Expressions of Emotion  
As shown in Experiment 1, not only do EA observers consistently miscategorise certain 
‘universal’ facial expressions, they also use a culture-specific fixation pattern that neglects 
critical face features (i.e., the mouth). Together, these results challenge the notion of a ‘universal 
language of emotion’ and support the view of cultural specificity in facial expression signals. To 
examine cultural specificity in facial expression signals, I used a powerful reverse correlation 
technique to reconstruct estimated culture-specific internal representations of the 6 ‘basic’ facial 
expressions of emotion. For the first time, I provided a direct demonstration of cultural 
specificity in facial expression signals – while WC observers represented emotion using features 
distributed across the face, EA observers represented emotion primarily using the eyes and 
neglected the mouth, as predicted by culture-specific fixation patterns shown in Experiment 1.  
 Together, these data reveal for the first time the origins of a latent phenomenon – the EA 
recognition deficit – and challenge long standing notions of a ‘universal language of emotion.’ 
More specifically, these data directly question the validity of ‘universal’ facial expressions of 
emotion as representing truly universal signals of human emotion. Here, I will address the 
limitations of such stimuli – FACS-coded ‘universal’ facial expressions of emotion.  
 4.1 Limitations of FACS-coded ‘Universal’ Facial Expression Stimuli 
Currently, FACS-coded ‘universal’ facial expressions of emotion9 are the most widely 
used and accepted form of stimuli for emotion research (e.g., Adolphs, Spezio, Parlier, & Piven, 
2008; Furl, van Rijsbergen, Treves, Friston, & Dolan, 2007; J. S. Morris, et al., 1998; Phelps, 
                                                 
9 ‘Universal’ facial expression stimuli include the following sets: Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion 
(JACFEE; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988), The Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF; Lundqvist, et al., 1998), The 
Radboud Faces Database (RaFD Langner, et al., 2010), Pictures of Facial Affect (POFA; Ekman & Friesen, 1976), Unmasking 
the Face-photo set (Ekman & Friesen, 1975), and Montreal Set of Facial Displays of 
Emotion (MSFDE; Beaupré, Cheung, & Hess, 2000). 
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Ling, & Carrasco, 2006; P.G. Schyns, et al., 2007; Philippe G. Schyns, et al., 2009; M. L. Smith, 
et al., 2005; Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2004). They are preferred for 
three reasons: 
a) rigorously controlled to eliminate irrelevant and potentially confounding variations 
(e.g., orientation, background colour, lighting, gender distribution and so forth) 
b) ‘universal’ implying that all 6 facial expressions are free from cultural bias and elicit 
comparable recognition performance across all cultural groups  
c) rigorously controlled to provide “equal emotion-signalling properties across encoder 
cultures” (Matsumoto, 2002, page 238).  
While point (a) is upheld, I will address points (b) and (c) to reveal substantial flaws, which 
invalidate them as truly universal facial expressions of emotion.  
4.1.1 ‘Universal’ Facial Expression Stimuli are Not Universal 
Although advertised as ‘universal’ facial expressions, closer inspection of the recognition 
literature shows that claims of universality are false. Rather, ‘universal’ facial expressions 
consistently elicit significant differences in recognition accuracy across diverse cultural groups 
(e.g., Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, et al., 1969; Jack, et al., 2009; 
Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Moriguchi, et al., 2005). For example, ‘fear’ and 
‘disgust’ consistently elicit lower recognition performance amongst EA compared to WC 
observers (e.g., Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Jack, et al., 2009; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto 
& Ekman, 1989). With such consistent differences in recognition performance across cultures, 
why are these facial expression stimuli claimed to be ‘universal?’ As mentioned previously in 
the Introduction, false claims of universality are based on faulty criteria. I will re-iterate the 
flaws in the criteria used so far as they reveal the extent to which ‘universal’ facial expression 
stimuli are invalidated as truly pan cultural signals of emotion.  
4.1.1.1. Criteria Used to Demonstrate ‘Universal Recognition’ is Flawed  
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As discussed previously, the literature has so far considered ‘universal recognition’ as 
“…demonstrated by two criteria: first, that [recognition accuracy is] significantly greater than 
chance; and second, that the percentage [is] greater than an arbitrary level, usually 70%, across 
all cultures” (Matsumoto, 1992, pg. 72). Such criteria present two significant problems.  
a) Insensitive Criteria Generates Type II errors  
Such criteria are too insensitive to detect any significant differences in recognition 
performance, thus masking systematic cultural differences reported in all such cross-cultural 
recognition studies (e.g., Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, et al., 
1969; Jack, et al., 2009; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Moriguchi, et al., 2005). 
As a result, so-called ‘universal’ facial expression stimuli would be incorrectly considered as 
eliciting comparable (i.e., no significant differences) in recognition performance. When more 
appropriate criteria are applied (e.g., statistically comparable recognition performance across 
cultures), the six ‘universal’ facial expression signals (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Matsumoto & 
Ekman, 1988) do not elicit universal recognition and therefore cannot be considered as universal 
signals of human emotion.  
b) Above Chance Performance Does Not Reflect ‘Normal’ Human Recognition  
Claiming that above chance performance (i.e., 14%-16% accuracy, depending on a 6-
AFC or 7-AFC task) demonstrates ‘recognition’ is completely unreasonable as it by no means 
reflects ecologically valid, ‘normal’ levels of human recognition. Indeed, if an observer were to 
perform at 14% accuracy when categorising any other set of objects (e.g., houses, cars, cats, dogs 
and so forth), the observer would likely have a serious cognitive deficiency that hinders visual 
perception and/or recognition. Presuming that none of the observers participating in any of the 
studies cited above suffered from any relevant cognitive impairment, it is certainly safe to say 
that the poor recognition performance is due to the invalidity of the stimuli. That is, certain 
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‘universal’ facial expressions simply do not accurately represent emotion in all cultures and 
therefore cannot be considered to be universal signals of human emotion. 
4.1.2 ‘Universal’ Facial Expressions are Culturally Biased 
Although certain cultural groups fail to accurately recognize some so-called ‘universal’ 
facial expressions, WC observers consistently achieve normal recognition (typically >85%) for 
all 6 facial expressions (e.g., Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, et al., 
1969; Jack, et al., 2009; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Moriguchi, et al., 2005), 
demonstrating that ‘universal’ facial expressions are in fact largely biased towards WC signals. 
Indeed, the inherent cultural bias is quite understandable when one considers their historical 
development of FACS-coded ‘universal’ facial expressions. In developing ‘universal’ facial 
expressions, early cross-cultural recognition studies (e.g., Ekman, et al., 1969) selected stimuli 
based on their conformity to Facial Action Scoring Technique (FAST, since abandoned and 
replaced with FACS) criteria (Ekman, Friesen, & Tomkins, 1971). Specifically, FAST/FACS 
criteria specify the pattern of functionally anatomical facial muscle movement (called Action 
Units or AUs) associated with each of the 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions of emotion. Such criteria 
are listed in the Emotion FACS (EMFACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1982) ‘dictionary’ for the 
purposes of accurately identifying specific facial expressions (see also Ekman, 1972; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1975, 1978). 
Yet, the FAST/FACS criteria suffer from a major flaw – the prescribed patterns of 
muscle contractions for each facial expression were based only on WC posed facial expressions 
recognized (i.e., at least 70% accuracy) by WC observers. Without any cross-cultural 
representation of facial expressions, FAST/FACS criteria represent WC biased facial 
expressions. Despite the clear methodological flaw, FAST/FACS criteria were listed in the 
Emotion FACS (EMFACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1982) dictionary and used to create sets of FACS-
coded ‘universal’ facial expressions commonly used in research today.  
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As demonstrated above, not only are FACS-coded ‘universal’ facial expressions 
inherently culturally biased in terms of their patterns of facial muscle activation, their supposed 
‘universality’ is based only on statistically and theoretically inappropriate criteria. Thus, contrary 
to popular belief, FACS-coded ‘universal’ facial expressions are not devoid of culture-specific 
expressive signals (Elfenbein & N. Ambady, 2002; Elfenbein, Beaupre, et al., 2007); they are, in 
fact, culturally biased WC-specific facial expressions.  
4.1.3 ‘Universal’ Facial Expressions Do not Provide Equal Signalling 
Properties Across Cultures  
As described above, FACS-coded facial expressions of emotion are rigorously 
controlled in terms of their signal properties. Specifically, each image within a facial expression 
category is represented using the same pattern of facial muscle activation, as prescribed by 
FACS criteria (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Controlling the signal properties of the facial 
expressions usefully eradicates any irrelevant signal variations, thus providing signal equality. 
However, prescription of WC biased facial expression patterns (via FACS coding criteria) 
introduces a culture-specific perceptual inequality to the stimulus set, as demonstrated by the 
reported cultural differences in recognition performance. That is, although FACS-coded 
‘universal’ facial expressions are physically equivalent, they are not perceptually equivalent 
across culturally different observer groups. Therefore, claims that FACS-coded ‘universal’ facial 
expressions provide “equal emotion-signalling properties across encoder cultures” (Matsumoto, 
2002, pg 238) is unfounded.  
This is an important point that has not so far been acknowledged by the current emotion 
literature – culture (i.e., conceptual knowledge) shapes perceptual experience, as demonstrated in 
the General Introduction with examples such as the Checker-shadow Illusion (Adelson, 1995) 
and culture-specific perceptual distortions of the colour spectrum (Davidoff, et al., 1999). 
4.1.4.‘Universal’ Facial Expressions are Not ‘Pure’ 
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The standardization of ‘universal’ facial expressions using FACS-coding was intended to 
eliminate any cultural influences (e.g., operation of display rules) and to create pan cultural and 
‘pure’ facial expressions of emotion (i.e., those generated by the Facial Affect Programme). Yet, 
in the absence of a direct demonstration that such facial expressions are indeed generated by the 
proposed Facial affect Programme, it is likely that each ‘universal’ facial expression is not 
‘pure,’ but in fact contaminated. Here, I will consider 2 potential sources of contamination – 
cultural and functional.  
4.1.4.1 Cultural Contamination 
The facial expressions used to create ‘universal’ facial expressions and the corresponding 
prescriptive FACS-code criteria were either ‘spontaneous’ or simulated by WC posers. In both 
cases, it is possible that the resulting facial expression could be contaminated with culture-
specific facial signals. When instructed to simulate a facial expression, posers are likely to have 
generated facial expressions typically used for social communication, rather than those which are 
innate and biological. Indeed, in most cases, posers were instructed to display a facial expression 
that would accurately communicate their emotions to their friends or family (e.g., Elfenbein, 
Beaupre, et al., 2007). Given that display rules are likely to be ingrained to the point of becoming 
habitual, it would seem unlikely that many observers have been exposed to reflexive facial 
expressions or are particularly practiced at simulating them. Thus, accurate simulation of an 
involuntary ‘pure' facial expression (i.e., those generated by the innate Facial Affect Programme) 
seems implausible and is certainly not verified anywhere in the literature. Similarly, so-called 
‘spontaneous’ facial expressions may still reflect culture-specific display rules, given proposals 
that such learned expression management techniques are habitual and therefore fast acting to the 
point where initial facial reactions may be completely masked (Ekman, 1972). Thus, any 
simulated or spontaneously generated facial expressions are likely to be contaminated by the top-
down influence of culture, such as display rules or ‘dialects.’ Indeed, standardized, cultural 
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‘accents’ are perceptible in ‘universal’ facial expressions as shown by Marsh and colleagues 
(Marsh, et al., 2003). However, the authors did not isolate the information that is culturally 
modulated (i.e., the face information that observers use to discriminate USA and Japanese 
nationals) and it remains as yet unknown which face information is diagnostic of USA versus 
Japanese nationality.  
4.1.4.2  Functional Contamination 
Facial expressions are generated under a variety of conditions to perform different 
functions – they can be a spontaneous, physiological response to an external stimulus (e.g., when 
one “gets a fright”), or they can be used during social interaction to communicate emotion where 
cultural/social rules can have a modulatory influence.  
Spontaneous Facial Expressions: Spontaneous facial expressions are considered to be a 
reflexive, physiological response, which are the vestiges of a protective reflex (Andrew, 1963; 
Susskind, et al., 2008). These involuntary, uncontaminated facial expressions are therefore likely 
to be innate and universal. Truly spontaneous facial expressions can only be obtained under 
conditions whereby the stimulus is strong enough to evoke an uninhibited facial expression (e.g., 
smelling very strong sulphur) and where no social factors influence expressive behaviour. While 
many anthropologists claimed to have captured spontaneous facial expressions, most examples 
were typically observed within social situations (e.g., funerals, child rearing, greetings and so 
forth). Such facial expressions are likely to reflect facial expressions used for social 
communication rather than those that are possibly innate and universal (i.e., reflexive facial 
expressions). To capture the appearance of truly reflexive facial expressions, several early 
studies induced emotion via internal generation (Feleky, 1924) or external provocation (e.g., 
Landis, 1924). However, such methods are likely to give rise to inconsistent results as it is 
unclear as to whether the stimuli evoked the same emotional experience across all observers 
(e.g., decapitating a rat could cause ‘fear’ in one person and ‘disgust’ in another) and whether the 
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emotion experienced is singular (‘pure’) or a combination of emotions (i.e., emotion "blends" 
Ekman, 1972). With no objective method of validation whether a facial expression produced is 
entirely reflexive, or representative of a single emotion, a demonstration of ‘non-social,’ innate 
facial expressions remains elusive. The ability to show facial expressions directly generated by a 
Facial Affect Programme remains a challenge for future multi-disciplinary investigation with 
neuroscientists (e.g., measure reflexive facial response at the brain level). 
Social Facial Expressions: Social facial expressions are the voluntary activation of facial 
muscles used to deliberately communicate emotion. For example, a smile is typically used when 
greeting someone to indicate the opportunity for positive interaction. Given the powerful top-
down influence on the production of social facial expressions and the likely shaping of social 
convention, it is entirely likely that such facial expressions differ significantly from reflexive 
facial expressions. It is also important to point out that while many studies on the recognition of 
facial expressions used posed ‘social’ facial expressions, the posed facial expression is likely to 
be an iconic representation rather than an ecologically valid reflection of facial expressions used 
during social interaction.  
 Here, I have identified a potential source of difference in the nature of facial 
expression signals in general – facial expressions can either be the result of a reflexive 
physiological reaction (e.g., smelling a very pungent odor) or produced under voluntary control 
during social situations to communicate internal states.  
Clearly, while studies focusing on the production of facial expressions (e.g., Feleky, 
1914; Landis, 1924) were examining the reflexive, physiological manifestations of internal 
emotional states, recognition studies more likely examined the facial expression signals used for 
emotion communication. Given that facial expressions have both a social (and therefore cultural) 
and physiological component, it is important to clearly separate out and examine each 
independently to more accurately represent facial expressions, as expressed by LaBarre in early 
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works: “In the language of gesture all over the world there are varying mixtures of the 
physiologically conditioned response and the purely cultural one, and it is frequently difficult to 
analyze out and segregate the two” (Labarre, 1947, pg. 57). 
Finally, it is important to highlight a significant methodological flaw in the creation of 
‘universal’ facial expressions, which questions whether such facial expressions accurately 
represent ‘pure’ facial expressions (either as social or reflexive). ‘Universal’ facial expressions 
are based on stimuli that “…conveyed a single specific emotion to observers…”(Ekman, et al., 
1971, pg 52). However, by using an AFC format, observers were restricted to only giving a 
single specific response (i.e., ‘happy,’ ‘sad,’ ‘angry’), even though they may have considered the 
face to represent a blended emotion (e.g., ‘angry’ and ‘sad’). It is unsurprising that the authors 
concluded the images “conveyed a single specific emotion,” but the claim is simply 
unsubstantiated.  
4.2  Implications of Using Current FACS-coded ‘Universal’ Stimuli in Research 
 As demonstrated above, both the prescribed FACS criteria for each ‘universal’ facial 
expression and the stimuli on which they are based (e.g., JACFEE, POFA and so forth) do not 
represent ‘universal’ signals of human emotion. Rather they represent culturally biased WC 
facial expression signals. Yet, this inherent bias is largely unknown, with such stimuli sets (e.g., 
JACFEE, POFA and so forth) and FACS criteria (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1975, 1982) continuing 
to be used in cross-cultural emotional research (e.g., Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006, 2009). 
Here, I will point out some of the negative implications of using these stimulus sets and the 
FACS criteria using examples from published work.  
4.2.1  Application of Biased FACS Criteria  
Some recent studies examining cross-cultural differences/universality in facial 
expressions have focused more on spontaneous rather than posed facial expressions of emotion 
as they represent more ecologically valid examples of emotional expression. For example, 
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Matsumoto & Willingham (2009) captured the facial expression of competing sportsmen during 
the announcement of results at the 2004 Olympic Games and compared displays of facial 
expressions across cultural groups (Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006). Although obtaining an 
impressively wide variety of naturally occurring facial expression images (~21,000 images), the 
authors only selected images that conformed to FACS-criteria (Ekman & Friesen, 1982), 
therefore systematically biasing their dataset. As a result, any cultural variation in facial 
expression signals would have been eliminated. Not surprisingly, the authors conclude that 
people from all cultures express emotion in the same way and that facial expressions are indeed 
‘universal’ (see also Matsumoto & Willingham, 2009).  
As demonstrated above, the use of ‘cookie-cutter’ methods to examine the complexities 
of facial expression signals is just too crude, especially when the ‘cookie-cutter’ is 
fundamentally flawed (i.e., strongly biased). It is also important to point out that the EMFACS 
(and therefore FACS criteria) lack peer review and should not be used for scientific purposes as 
is the case currently (e.g., Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 1992; Ekman, Matsumoto, & Friesen, 1997; 
Keltner, Moffitt, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1995; Matsumoto, Haan, Yabrove, Theodorou, & 
Carney, 1986; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2009; Rosenberg & 
Ekman, 1994; Rosenberg, Ekman, & Blumenthal, 1998; Rosenberg, et al., 2001).  
4.2.2. Use of Biased ‘Universal’ Facial Expression Stimuli  
4.2.2.1  Facial Expression Processing  
Using the term ‘universal’ to describe a facial expression stimulus set reasonably infers 
that the stimuli elicit comparable recognition performance across all observer groups. Yet, this is 
entirely unsubstantiated by the literature – ‘universal’ facial expressions do not elicit universal 
recognition in the traditionally understood sense (see points 5.1.1.1. a-b above). Given that 
‘universal’ facial expression stimulus sets don’t do what it says on the tin, use of the term 
‘universal’ is misleading to researchers and could result in significant methodological problems. 
89 
 
For example, Moriguchi et al., (2005) used a ‘universal’ stimulus set in good faith to examine 
cultural differences in the brain’s response to ‘fear’ ful faces between WC and EA observers 
(Moriguchi, et al., 2005). However, the EA observers systematically categorised ‘fear’ facial 
expressions as ‘surprise,’ as predicted by previous data (Matsumoto, 1989). Consequently, the 
authors were unable to obtain a meaningful brain response to ‘fear’ ful faces amongst the EA 
group.  
The above example is a cogent demonstration that current so-called ‘universal’ facial 
expressions of emotion cannot be used in (most)10cross-cultural research where the aim is to 
examine the influence of culture upon facial expression processing per se. Rather, current 
‘universal’ facial expressions (e.g., JACFEE, POFA, KDEF, etc.) only represent one cultural 
group (WC). At present, there is no equivalent stimulus set that accurately represents any other 
culture, thus limiting scientific progression in this area (i.e., how people of different cultures 
process facial expressions of emotion).  
4.2.2.2  Facial Expression Processing In a Cross-Cultural Design  
Another area of research limited (or potentially biased) by the current stimulus set is in 
understanding the complexities of cross-cultural communication of emotion. For example, 
during cross-cultural communication, do observers decode and interpret facial expressions in the 
same way as during intra-cultural communication? This question is loosely related to the in-
group advantage theory, which proposes that observers more accurately recognize facial 
expressions displayed by members of their own culture compared to those displayed by other-
culture members (Elfenbein & N. Ambady, 2002). While the in-group advantage theory and 
related ideas have been actively discussed in the literature (Elfenbein & N. Ambady, 2002; H. A. 
                                                 
10 It is important to point out here that my use of the ‘universal’ JACFEE facial expression stimulus set in 
Experiment 1 is entirely appropriate given the research question: Experiment 1 investigated the origins of the EA 
recognition deficit for ‘universal’ facial expressions (i.e., those depicted by the JACFEE stimulus set) as reported in 
the literature (e.g., Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, et al., 1969; Jack, et al., 2009; 
Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Moriguchi, et al., 2005). 
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Elfenbein & N. Ambady, 2002; Matsumoto, 2002), it is not yet clear which information could 
potentially give rise to the proposed in-group advantage – that is, which information ought to 
indicate group affiliation. Two factors should reasonably be considered as potential identifiers of 
‘in-group’ status – a (controlled) culture-specific feature (e.g., skin colour, facial characteristics, 
hairstyle, clothing etc.) or, as the authors suggest (see Elfenbein & N. Ambady, 2002), culture-
specific facial expressions (i.e., cultural ‘accents’).  
In both cases, a fully balanced design would be required such that each cultural observer 
group would be exposed to both the cultural identifiers. To illustrate the importance of using a 
balanced design, consider the following unbalanced design used to examine whether culture-
specific facial expressions generate differences in facial expression decoding across observer 
groups: 2 observer groups (WC and EA) and 1 set of culturally valid facial expressions (WC). 
Any difference found (i.e., same-culture facial expressions – WC observers decoding WC facial 
expressions – are decoded differently from other-culture facial expressions – EA observers 
decoding WC facial expressions) could be due to a culture-specific decoding strategy (Jack, et 
al., 2009), and not related to cross-cultural communication per se. Let’s now consider the 
alternative unbalanced design: 1 observer group (WC) X 2 sets of culturally valid facial 
expressions (EA). Similarly, any difference here (i.e., same- versus other-culture facial 
expressions are decoded differently) could be due to a culture-specific (i.e., WC) decoding 
strategy that is not generalizable to any other cultural group. Thus, in order to truly understand 
the complexities of cross-cultural communication, a fully balanced design is necessary.  
4.2.2.3  The Influence of Race on Facial Expression Decoding  
Now let’s examine each potentially relevant factor in turn and assess whether current 
facial expression stimuli can be used to adequately address the question. First, does the 
perception of ‘in-group’ versus ‘out-group’ affiliation influence emotion communication as 
measured by the decoding and interpretation of facial expressions? Specifically, do WC 
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observers decode and interpret facial expressions in the same way when they are displayed by 
WC compared to EA posers (and vice versa, this adhering to the necessary balanced design). To 
examine this question, it is important to first isolate the factor in question – the information that 
reliably indicates ‘in-group’ versus ‘out-group,’ in this case the race of face. While race of face is 
manipulated as part of the experimental design (i.e., half of the stimuli are EA faces), all other 
information must be controlled, as clearly stated by Matsumoto “If stimuli portraying emotion 
expressed by people of two different cultural groups are to be judged by members of both of 
those groups, then the characteristics of the stimuli specific to the emotion message must be 
exactly equivalent between the two expresser cultures, whereas only the characteristics related to 
cultural identification should vary” (Matsumoto, 2002, pg. 237). Thus, the facial expressions 
displayed by both the WC and EA posers should be equally recognizable by both WC and EA 
observers when no cultural affiliation is indicated. As a result, we can ascertain whether 
perception of ‘in-group’ versus ‘out-group’ member affiliation (i.e., race/ethnicity) generates a 
perceptual change that influences the decoding and interpretation of facial expressions.  
Is there is a stimulus set that can adequately address this question? The short answers is 
no – there is, as yet, no stimulus set that elicits comparable recognition performance across all 
cultural groups. Indeed, the only stimulus set specifically designed to examine the influence of 
ethnicity/race on facial expression decoding (the JACFEE stimulus database) cannot provide a 
balanced design as it does not provide “equal emotion-signalling properties across observer 
cultures,” as is claimed (Matsumoto, 2002, pg 238). Specifically, while the JACFEE stimulus set 
is rigorously controlled for gender, race (EA and WC) and the physical facial expression signals 
(each facial expression is displayed using exactly the same pattern of facial muscle activation), 
the facial expression signals are unbalanced as they only represent one cultural group (i.e., 
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WC)11. That is, the characteristics of the stimuli are not exactly equivalent to both members of 
the observer groups – they are, in fact, perceptually different. Thus, any attempt to examine the 
influence on racial/ethnic identity on facial expression recognition using such stimuli would be 
confounded by the perceptual inequalities of the stimuli across cultural groups. It is important to 
point out here that the reported cross-cultural differences in recognition performance elicited by 
the ‘universal’ JACFEE facial expressions are not due to the perception of ‘in-group’ versus 
‘out-group’ (i.e., racial/ethnic) affiliation but is due to the fact that JACFEE facial expressions 
represent WC biased facial expressions (e.g., Jack, et al., 2009). 
As demonstrated above, there is as yet, no stimulus set that can be used to adequately 
examine whether perceived ‘in-group’ versus ‘out-group’ affiliation (as defined by 
race/ethnicity) influences the decoding and interpretations of facial expressions as current stimuli 
can only offer a WC biased, unbalanced design.  
4.2.2.4  Decoding Culture-specific Facial Expressions  
Let us now turn to the second factor relevant for understanding cross-cultural 
communication – How do observers of different cultures decode and interpret ‘in-group’ versus 
‘out-group’ facial expressions (i.e., is there an in-group advantage)? First, it is important to point 
out that this question is entirely justified given the overwhelming amount of behavioural data 
showing that facial expressions (as represented by FACS-coded facial expression) are not 
universal, supporting views of cultural specificity in facial expression signals (H. A. Elfenbein & 
N. Ambady, 2002). Furthermore, as reported in Experiment 2, I have provided the first direct 
demonstration of cultural specificity in facial expression signals, thus justifying the rationale for 
asking such a research question.  
                                                 
11 My use of the JACFEE stimulus set in Experiment 1 did not create an unbalanced design as the aim was not to 
examine cultural differences in the decoding of (culturally valid) facial expressions, but instead 1 investigated the 
origins of the EA recognition deficit for ‘universal’ facial expressions (i.e., those depicted by the JACFEE stimulus 
set) as reported in the literature (e.g., Biehl, et al., 1997; Chan, 1985; Ekman, et al., 1987; Ekman, et al., 1969; Jack, 
et al., 2009; Matsumoto, 1992; Matsumoto & Ekman, 1989; Moriguchi, et al., 2005). 
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To address the above question using an appropriately balanced design, both observer 
groups would be exposed to both sets of culturally valid facial expression stimuli. For example, 
WC and EA observers would decode and interpret both WC and EA facial expressions. Is there 
is a stimulus set that can adequately address this question? Again, the answer is no. As pointed 
out above, with only WC validated facial expression stimuli currently available and with no 
equivalent stimulus set that accurately represents any other culture, a balanced design is beyond 
reach. As a result, it remains unknown as to whether observers are significantly better at judging 
facial expressions from their own culture (i.e., the in-group advantage). At this point, it is worth 
pointing out that Elfenbein and colleagues (Elfenbein, Beaupre, et al., 2007) recently 
investigated the in-group advantage using a balanced design using 2 sets of culture-specific 
facial expressions (Québecois and Gabonese). Specifically, the authors examined whether the 
posed facial expressions contained cultural ‘dialects’ as measured by differences in AUs and also 
whether an in-group advantage was demonstrated by a cross-cultural recognition task. However, 
neither the Québecois nor the Gabonese facial expression images can be considered to be 
culturally representative, as demonstrated by the particularly low recognition accuracy reported 
in the paper. For example, the mean recognition accuracy of Québecois observers categorising 
Québecois posed facial expressions of ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’ was as low 
as 56%, 34%, 54%, 47% and 39%, respectively. Similarly, the mean recognition accuracy of 
Gabonese observers categorising Gabonese posed facial expressions of ‘surprise’ ,’ ‘fear,’ 
‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’ were as low as 50%, 18%, 35%, 33% and 38%, respectively. 
Furthermore, the stimuli suffer from a number of stimulus control inadequacies such as size of 
face, lighting, idiosyncratic hairstyles and so forth (see page 137 in Elfenbein, Beaupre, et al., 
2007 for examples), which can lead to spurious differences. Consequently, such stimuli cannot 
be used to adequately examine a) whether ecologically valid facial expressions contain culture-
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specific ‘dialects’ or b) if the in-group advantage is a legitimate psychological phenomenon 
within cross-cultural communication of emotion.  
4.2.2.5  Interaction of Race and Culture-specific Facial Expression  
In the context of comparing culturally diverse group, racial characteristics (e.g., skin 
colour, facial morphology) are an inevitable perceptual indicator of specific cultural 
affiliations12. For example, when presented with an EA face, the observer is likely to assume that 
the person is of an Eastern culture, based on probabilistic reasoning. Thus, racial characteristics 
are an important point for consideration and empirical inclusion when examining the cross-
cultural interactions. For example, WC-specific facial expressions are likely to be more 
ecologically valid and representative if displayed by a racially congruent individual (i.e., a white 
Caucasian). Indeed, a relevant empirical question is how these two distinct cultural identifiers 
(i.e., racial characteristics and culture-specific facial expressions) influence socially relevant 
categorizations. For example, is facial expression decoding modulated by the cultural 
incongruence of facial expression and racial characteristics (e.g., a WC poser displaying an EA-
specific facial expression)? Similarly, is race categorization (as measured by reaction time; see 
R. Caldara, Rossion, Bovet, & Hauert, 2004; Levin, 1996; Valentine & Endo, 1992) modulated 
by the cultural incongruence of the facial expressions displayed? For example, the Other-Race 
Effect (ORE) – characterized by faster race categorization of other- compared to same-race faces 
– could be dampened by culturally incongruent (i.e., same culture) facial expressions by 
influencing the perception of group affiliation. In short, such questions address the extent to 
which certain socially relevant information which acts as a cultural identifier exerts a powerful 
influence on the perceptual decoding of emotional signals and on social interaction behaviours 
generally.  
                                                 
12 Clearly, this depends on the research question. For example, if examining how Rangers and Celtic fans interact, 
racial characteristics are unlikely to be a concern as it is unlikely that either group possesses perceptually distinct 
facial characteristics diagnostic of their cultural affiliation. Rather, cultural affiliation would be indicted by an 
external symbol, such as football colours.  
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4.3 Future Work  
Here, I have highlighted the limitations of the facial expression stimuli currently 
available, namely those which are FACS-coded and advertised as ‘universal.’ Specifically, I 
have demonstrated that it is entirely inappropriate and misleading to claim that FACS-coded 
facial expressions (the only accepted standardized stimuli set in research) are ‘universal.’ 
Consequently, using such stimuli to address certain research questions inevitably introduces 
methodological flaws by unbalancing the experimental design. Thus, certain relevant cross-
cultural questions cannot be adequately addressed with such biased stimuli, requiring significant 
improvements in the stimulus resources available for research. To address this gap in resources, I 
will now outline the specifications and developmental direction required to provide adequate 
stimulus sets for future cross-cultural research and detail future and current projects aiming to 
address this gap.  
  4.3.1 Improving Stimuli for Future Research 
As discussed previously, current facial expression stimuli are considered to be ‘universal’ 
if a certain statistically and theoretically flawed criterion is met – above chance recognition 
performance (>14% accuracy). Clearly, such criterion neither demonstrates ‘normal’ human 
recognition nor is sensitive enough to detect significant differences in recognition performance 
across observer groups. Given that the vast majority of the emotion literature accepts this 
criterion as a reliable indicator of ‘universal recognition,’ it is imperative that such pivotal 
concepts are explicitly re-established within the literature to improve experimental design, data 
interpretation and future directions. Furthermore, such terms are the tools by which we 
communicate complex concepts, thus a shared understanding of these terms will help avoid 
confusion and miscommunication in the future. To re-iterate the magnitude of the current 
situation, I refer to my previous example (page 86) where Moriguchi and colleagues (Moriguchi, 
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et al., 2005) used ‘universal’ facial expressions in good faith only to later suffer severe 
methodological problems and ultimately data loss at the hands of false advertizing.  
As described, current facial expression stimuli do not meet the criteria necessary to 
adequately conduct cross-cultural research as they only accurately represent facial expressions 
one cultural group (WC), as measured by recognition accuracy. As a result, with stimulus 
validity limited to WC displays of emotion, knowledge of different cultural groups is suspended 
(Henrich, et al., 2010). To create a truly universal facial expression stimulus set, it is essential 
that the facial expression signals depicting each of the 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions (i.e., ‘happy,’ 
‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’) are recognized with statistically comparable and 
ecologically valid levels of accuracy (i.e., >75% accuracy). Two possible options are available – 
1) creating a single uniform set of facial expression signals (i.e., 6 facial expression signals), or 
2) separate culture-specific subsets of facial expression signals (i.e., 6 facial expressions per 
cultural group), both of which meet the above recognition criterion (>75% accuracy). In both 
cases, the facial expression stimuli would provide perceptual stimulus equivalence across 
observer cultures, allowing the necessary balanced design. To examine the empirical suitability 
of both stimulus sets, let’s consider each in turn.  
4.3.1.1 Culture-specific Subsets of Facial Expression Signals 
By creating culture-specific facial expression stimuli, several cross-cultural research 
questions could be addressed. For example, examining the in-group advantage whereby 
recognition performance of each observer group decoding the facial expressions of their own 
versus other cultural groups would be tested and compared. Similarly, to better understand the 
perceptual processes underlying cross-cultural communication, eye tracking technology could be 
used to investigate the decoding of own versus other cultural facial expressions. Furthermore, by 
direct comparison of each AU, the facial information unique to each cultural group could be 
identified, revealing specifically how facial expressions differ across cultures. Similarly, using 
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the Bubbles technique (Gosselin & Schyns, 2001) – which isolates the information required for 
categorization – the expressive features used by each culture to accurately recognize facial 
expressions could be isolated. Together, these newly accessible investigations would yield novel 
results in the field of culture and emotion, elevating knowledge of cross-cultural communication 
of emotion.  
Future Work 1: Dynamic Facial Expressions of Emotion – 4D Stimuli and the Future  
To address this gap in resources, I will create 2 subsets of culture-specific facial 
expressions of emotion using the same RC technique used in Experiment 2. Specifically, I will 
reconstruct 4D, culture-specific representations of the 6 ‘basic’ facial expressions of emotion to 
improve upon static (2/3D) images of facial expressions of emotion. Tomkins and McCarter 
highlight this requirement in early works: “The photograph congeals this motion into a still 
which is never entirely adequate as a recognizable affective response” (Tomkins & McCarter, 
1964, pg. 126).  
To achieve this, WC and EA observers will be presented with dynamic face stimuli 
where each AU (50 in total) will be randomly activated on 6 parameters (i.e., peak intensity, 
peak latency, onset latency, offset latency, acceleration, and deceleration). After viewing the 
dynamic display, observers will indicate the perceived relative contribution of the 6 ‘basic’ facial 
expressions of emotion using a sliding scale (0-5). Using a multi-choice task allows a more 
accurate assessment of the presented information by the observer, thus avoiding the limitations 
of using AFC tasks, as described previously. As a result, we can examine whether there are 
specific emotion blends frequently represented by either culture. Each culture-specific 
representation for each of the 6 facial expressions will then be reconstructed and can then later 
used to create full colour, 4D facial expression stimuli. For example, the WC representation of 
‘disgust’ (i.e., the dynamic facial muscle pattern) can be married with the facial texture (e.g., 
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skin, eye colour) of an EA female identity. Several WC and EA textures (equally distributed for 
gender) will be gathered to create fully interchangeable stimulus sets for future research projects.  
While culture-specific subsets of facial expressions would be appropriate for certain 
research questions (e.g., how do observers of different cultures decode and interpret culture-
specific facial expressions?), the inherent physical differences in the signals (e.g., EA ‘fear’ 
versus WC ‘fear’) would exclude them from use for other research questions. To illustrate, 
consider the following research question asked previously by Moriguchi and colleagues - do WC 
and EA observers process ‘fear’ ful faces in the same way as measured by fMRI?’ While use of 
culture-specific facial expression signals would ensure that both observer groups were 
processing a ‘fear’ ful face, any physical difference between the ‘fear’ ful faces could give rise to 
a potential confound in the data. That is, significant differences in brain response could be 
related to differences between the physical signals rather than a reflection of cognitive 
differences the experiment intends to examine.  
4.3.1.2  Single Uniform Set of Facial Expressions 
To satisfy the relevant methodological requirement that facial expressions stimuli are 
both physically equivalent (each facial expression is displayed using exactly the same pattern of 
facial muscle activation) and perceptually equivalent across observer groups, a single uniform set 
of facial expression signals that are recognized with comparable accuracy across all cultures 
would be required. To do this, the truly universal facial expression information must be 
identified and isolated to create a single uniform stimulus set. Indeed, non-random (i.e., above 
chance recognition) responses to ‘universal’ facial expressions by diverse cultural groups 
demonstrate that ‘universal’ facial expressions may contain elements of universal signals of 
emotion. Indeed, it is quite possible that truly universal signals of emotion are present in many 
culture-specific facial expressions. For example, consider the following culture-specific facial 
expression of the Oryia women in Bhubaneswar, India. Shweder reports a commonly used facial 
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expression “in which the tongue extends out and downward and is bitten between the teeth, the 
eyebrows rise, and the eyes widen, bulge, and cross” (Shweder, 1991, pg. 246). Based on the 
available information, we might reasonably conclude that the woman is frightened or ‘surprise’ 
d, on account of the raised eyebrows and widened eyes. In fact, we would be correct – this 
particular facial expression represents ‘surprise’ /embarrassment/fear. Thus, to correctly interpret 
this unfamiliar facial expression, the ‘universal’ elements have been identified and those which 
are perhaps inexplicable and culture-specific (i.e., tongue protrusion, crossing of the eyes) have 
been ignored.  
In acknowledging the involvement of culture-specific factors in modulating the display of 
facial expressions (i.e., display rules), it has been stated that “…the sources of cultural variability 
are so many that it is exceedingly difficult to observe the common facial expressions of emotion 
across cultures” (Ekman, 1972, pg 234). However, although claiming to have isolated and 
demonstrated the ‘basic’ set of ‘universal’ facial expressions (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1975; 
Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988), no attempt has been made, as yet, to examine the signal properties 
of the facial expressions to determine which are universal across all groups and those which are 
culture-specific (but see Marsh, et al., 2003 for cultural 'accents'). Thus, it is important to isolate 
both the cultural and universal signals of emotion to understand exactly how culture has 
modified the universal signals of human emotion. To address this, I will use complementary 
statistical image processing tools to examine the dynamic expressive facial signals in culture-
specific facial expressions of emotion to identify any such universal emotional signals. Similarly, 
I will use the Bubbles technique to isolate the expressive features used for accurate facial 
expression categorization in WC and EA groups to determine culture-specific and universal 
information use.  
Future work 2: Mapping The Conceptual Landscapes of Diverse Cultures 
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Culture represents an intricate system of values, knowledge and beliefs, which 
correspond to cultural variability in language terms used to express cultural concepts. Indeed, 
Wilhelm von Humboldt described language as “the expression of the spirit of a nation” (von 
Humboldt, 1836/1999). Culture-specific semantic organization reflecting conceptual differences 
across cultures and could be associated with cognitive and perceptual differences. For example, 
Roberson and colleagues showed that perceptual colour category boundaries are influenced by 
cultural linguistic systems (Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000). Cultural differences in the 
decoding and interpretation of facial expressions of emotion could also be influenced by culture-
specific conceptions of emotion.  
Taking inspiration from Davidoff’s colour study described previously (Davidoff, et al., 
1999), I will aim to map the conceptual landscape of emotion, specifically facial expressions, in 
two distinct cultural groups – WC and EA. To do this, I will use data obtained from Future work 
1 where WC and EA observers will categorise all13 possible combinations of facial muscle 
movements (i.e., all possible facial behaviours). As a result, I can reveal where the emotion 
boundaries lie in range of facial expressions and whether such boundaries are common across all 
cultures. Furthermore, I have taken into consideration that the 6 so-called ‘basic’ emotions (i.e., 
‘happy,’ ‘surprise,’ ‘fear,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘anger’ and ‘sad’) may not necessarily be universally 
agreed. For example, Roberson and colleagues showed that the focal colours (specific colours 
centered on ‘pink,’ ‘yellow,’ ‘orange,’ ‘red,’ ‘green,’ ‘blue,’ and ‘purple’) widely believed to 
universal are not shared by all observers (Roberson, et al., 2000). Given how variant cultural 
concepts of emotion are in terms of antecedents etc., (e.g., Mesquita & Frijda, 1992) it is quite 
likely that emotion boundaries and basic categories differ across cultures, as argued by some 
(Russell, 1994). Therefore, to develop a richer understanding of the cultural effects on 
                                                 
13 The total number of possible combinations represents a combinatorial explosion (50 AUs with 6 parameters 
adjusted on a continuous scale). To manage the design intelligently, I will ensure that the combinations of AUs and 
parameter values represent a robust selection across all possible combinations.  
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perception, specifically related to emotion, it is important to map the conceptual landscapes of 
diverse cultures. 
On a broader note, examining cultural specificity of ‘emotion’ is more than just the 
recognition of facial expressions. ‘Emotion’ encompasses a wide range of dimensions that relate 
to emotional experience whereby the display of a facial expression rests under the dimension of 
‘emotional behaviour,’ as does physiological responses such as heart rate and perspiration. 
Indeed, recent research documents the cultural specificity of emotional experience and linguistic 
expressions (Fiske et al., 1998; Harre, 1986; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mesquita & Frijda, 
1992; Mesquita et al., 1997; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). Yet, direct demonstrations of the 
characteristics and dimensions of culture-specific internal concepts remain elusive. To truly 
understand cross-cultural communication of emotion, it is important to elucidate each conceptual 
dimension, mapping the culture-specific landscape of the concept ‘emotion’ using objective 
methods.  
5. Summary Conclusion 
Although facial expressions may well have biological origins, those roots are as deep as 
those which gave us tail bones, goose bumps, wisdom teeth and ‘third eyes’ (Darwin, 
1999/1872). In our newly interconnected world, now is the time to turn more attention towards 
how thousands of years of culture have shaped the basic, biological skills of facial expression 
transmission and decoding. Otherwise, when it comes to communicating negative emotions 
across cultures, Easterners and Westerners will continue to find themselves lost in translation. 
Importantly, while not denying the biological or evolutionary origins of facial expressions or the 
existence of universal signals of human emotion, I have illustrated that truly universal facial 
expression signals remain unknown. As a result, current research remains limited by the 
substandard tools available. I will address this gap in resources in subsequent work and use the 
resulting stimuli to continue to advance knowledge in the field of culture and emotion.  
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